Agency problems with non-smooth decision profiles: the case of monopoly under product quality

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2011Suggested citation
Ruiz del Portal, X. (Xavier);
.
(2011)
.
Agency problems with non-smooth decision profiles: the case of monopoly under product quality.
SERIEs, 2011. vol. 2, núm.1, p. 121–137.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s13209-009-0003-x.
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A method for dealing with monotonicity constraints in optimal control
problems is used to generalize some results in the context of monopoly theory, also extending the generalization to a large family of principal-agent programs. Our main conclusion is that many results on diverse economic topics, achieved under assumptions of continuity and piecewise differentiability in connection with the endogenous variables of the problem, still remain valid after replacing such assumptions by two minimal requirements.
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SERIEs, 2011. vol. 2, núm.1, p. 121–137European research projects
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