CAPTIVES AT THE CONQUEST OF MALLORCA: SEPTEMBER 1229-JULY 1232

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ABSTRACT

The present article re-examines the chronicles on the conquest of Mallorca (1229-1232) in order to evaluate the role played by the taking of prisoners during military operations. The possibility of taking captive the population of the island, who had no means of escape, was an important incentive for the military forces involved in the campaign, as well as for the nobles who arrived on the island after the disbanding of the army that took the madīna. The sources demonstrate that all military operations revolved around the management of captive populations. Pacts which spared the local population, such as that signed with Xuaip, were exceptional and, ultimately, violated. The outcome of this process was the extinction of the local population.1

KEYWORDS

Mallorca, Jaume I, conquest, captivity, slavery, booty.

CAPITALLIA VERBA

Maiorica, Rex Iacobus Primus, Conquestio, Captivitas, Servitudo, Praeda.
1. Introduction

The fact that no viable indigenous Muslim population remained in Mallorca after the conquest of the island by the Catalans in 1229 has been amply demonstrated by Ricard Soto.3 By ‘viable population’, we mean a social group which, despite having suffered military defeat and severe personal and material losses, and despite having been forcibly removed from their original settlements, managed to restore the essential conditions for survival and the social links necessary for its reproduction. No such survival occurred in Mallorca.4 Most historians have accepted the fact that the autochthonous population of Mayûrqa (Muslim Mallorca) was ultimately driven to extinction, even though this new paradigm has not yet been incorporated into general works and textbooks.5

1. Research group: Agricultural Archaeology of the Middle Ages (ARAEM). This article was written within the framework of the project Òrdenes agrarios y conquistas ibéricas (siglos XII-XVI). Estudios desde la arqueología histórica (HAR2017-82157-P), financed by the Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad, Spanish Government. I wish to thank Helena Kirchner, Félix Retamero, Antoni Virgili and the reviewers for their comments. I appreciate the accurate translation carried out by David J. Govantes-Edwards. Any remaining errors my sole responsibility. Used Abbreviations: ARM, Arxiu del Regne de Mallorca.


4. Soto, Ricard. ‘La conquista de Mallorca...’: 66. This contradicts the traditional thesis, which until recently remained unchallenged. Álvaro Santamaría was the main advocate of the idea that most of the Andalusi inhabitants of the island were first made captive, only to be baptised, enfranchised and absorbed by the Christian population some time later (Santamaría, Álvaro. Ejecutoria del reino de Mallorca, 1230-1343. Palma: Ajuntament de Palma, 1990: 51-265). For a revision of these ideas, see Soto, Ricard. “La situació dels andalusins...”: 179-180, note 50; and Soto, Ricard; Mas, Antoni. “Feudal-colonisation and socio-ecological transition in Mayûrqa (Muslim Majorca) in the thirteenth century”. Continuity and Change, 30/3 (2015): 341-366.

5. Antoni Furió also contributed to establish the fact that the conquered population had been reduced to a state of captivity (Furió, Antoni. “Esclaus i assalariats. La funció econòmica de l’esclavitud en la Península Ibèrica a la Baixa Edat Mitjana”, De l’esclavitud a la llibertat. Esclaus i lliberts a l’Edat Mitjana,
In a similar vein, an article by Aurèlia Jené and various works by Jaume Sastre Moll have complemented Cosme Parpal’s classic study on the impact of the conquest for the indigenous population of Manūrqa (Muslim Menorca) in 1287. The ideas presented in these works provided Ricard Soto’s arguments concerning Mallorca with extra leverage. More recent works have addressed the issue in relation to the islands of Ibiza and Formentera, and the conclusions have been the same: the initial state of captivity led to the extinction of the local population. Referring to Menorca, the chronicler Ramon Muntaner already described the situation in no uncertain terms: the conquest was the destrucció d’una nació de gent.

The resulting society was built, not without difficulty, on top of the material remains left by the indigenous population, and to a large extent using the labour of some of its members. Other captives, in contrast, were sold on the continental market. Ricard Soto mentions a sale contract that stipulated the delivery of some captives in Ceuta, where they were presumably ransomed. What proportion of the population was exported is uncertain, owing to the limitations of the available evidence. However, the later, and better documented, events in Menorca allow for

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7. Throughout the present article, “captive”/“slave”, and “captivity”/“slavery” are used interchangeably.


10. For the employment of captives in agriculture, see: Soto, Ricard. “La conquista de Mallorca...”.: 63-76.


12. Verlinden, Charles. L’esclavage dans l’Europe médiévale. Péninsule Ibérique-France. Bruges: Rijksuniversiteit te Gent, De Tempel, 1955: 252; quotes Brutails, Auguste. “Étude sur l’esclavage en Roussillon du XIIIe au XVIIe siècle”. Nouvelle Revue historique de Droit français et étranger, 10 (1886): 9-10 as evidence for the exportation of captives from Mallorca to the Roussillon, but in fact Brutails only says that ils durent abonder à la suite de la conquête de Majorque, en 1229. Moreover, this statement is based on a single document —the will of Bernard de Berga, Bishop of Elna— which is, in addition, dated to 1259, many years after the events. In
some extrapolations to be made with regard to Mallorca and Ibiza. In Menorca, the king led the way to turning all that could be taken on the island into booty, and his written instructions are preserved in the chancellery documents held in the Archive of the Crown of Aragón.\textsuperscript{13} In addition, the discovery, in Barcelona and Marseilles, of ceramic types that imitate Andalusi shapes (which are well attested in Mallorca prior to the conquest), in contexts dated to the first half of the 13\textsuperscript{th} century, suggests that certain type of professionally qualified captives —potters, in this case— were indeed being exported. The presence of these ceramic types has been interpreted as evidence for the settlement of Andalusi, Maghrebi or Oriental artisans in these cities.\textsuperscript{14}

Álvaro Santamaría remarked that, between 1240 and 1258, the price of slaves “had a clear tendency to go up”,\textsuperscript{15} whereas Ricard Soto claims that, between 1242 and 1259, the number of export records for captives decreased while the first import records are now also attested. Soto associated this with “problems relating to the biological reproduction” of the autochthonous captives.\textsuperscript{16} The issue revolves around two factors of medieval slavery which have received but little attention to date: the service life and the life expectancy of slaves. In the plantation system established much later in the American colonies for the production of market crops, the service

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15. Una clara tendencia al alza. Santamaría, Álvaro. \textit{Ejекторia del reino de Mallorca...}: 145-146.\textsuperscript{16}

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life of slaves was 15 or 20 years, at most. Slave contingents were maintained by the addition of new numbers, rather than by biological reproduction through births, which only played a secondary role in the reproduction of the group; there were few family trees among slaves. Death, captivity and exile disintegrated the Andalusi society of Mayūrqa and the other islands. The conquests of Mallorca (1229-1232), Ibiza (1235) and Menorca (1287), are the clearest and most decisive historical caesuras ever experienced by the inhabitants of the archipelago.

In the present article, I argue that the possibility of turning people into wealth made the population of Mayūrqa a major objective of the war. Greed for booty, especially human booty, was the main drive for the participants in the campaign, which lasted for over two years. There were, naturally, the king’s reasons: the desire to increase his possessions and the strategic position of the islands. Yet, in order for his personal ambitions to succeed, the king needed to create a multi-layered structure of incentives, and the possibility of turning the local population into booty was the main incentive for the members of the army, as has been confirmed by multiple accounts. The complete extinction of the Andalusi population of Mayūrqa was a result of it being turned into a marketable commodity. The total destruction of the indigenous population is an exclusive trait of the conquest of the Balearic Islands. The pacts signed by Jaume I and the Andalusi population, if ever there was a will to abide by them, were not sufficient protection against the profitable

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22. la conquista no generó pactos (“the conquest did not result in pacts”). Soto, Ricard. “La conquista de Mallorca...” 65; la ‘solución mallorquina’ comportó, pues, un cautiverio generalizado y masivo de los andalusiés (“in Mallorca, therefore, the conquest led to the wholesale captivity of the Andalusis”). Torró, Josep. “De bona guerra...” 447.
naturally the practice of capturing and selling Muslim slaves, regardless of whether they had signed a pact or not.23

2. Walking booty: the captive population

In November 1229, the impending campaign against the island of Mallorca was advertised in France. The aim of the campaign, it was claimed, was to capture or scatter the enemy and to return this land to under God’s protection and thus extend Christianity.24 The final fate of the inhabitants of al-Andalus’ Eastern Islands had been sealed long before, when one of the versions of the proclamation made by Urban II in Clermont in 1095 explicitly mentioned the Balearic Islands.25 Barely a few hours after Jaume I and his host had set foot on the island, the Bishop of Barcelona blew the dust off these old pronouncements and called for the unity of those who wished to destroy the enemies of the true faith in the name of Jesus.26 Years later, in 1235, while preparing the conquest of Ibiza and Formentera, Guillelm de Montgrí, brother of Bernat de Santa Eugènia, Peter, prince of Portugal, and Nuno Sanç, Count of Roussillon, declared that the aim of the conquest was to take the land from the Saracens, to expel the infidel and to settle the islands with a community that was acceptable in God’s eyes.

According to the Llibre dels fets (“Book of Deeds”) and Bernat Desclot’s chronicle, the Cortes that met late in 1228 debated and endorsed the conquest of Mallorca. Members of the aristocracy and the Church, as well as representatives of the different cities, named the conditions for their participation in the enterprise.27 They requested that booty, both movable and se movente (literally, self-propelling,  

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walking) must be proportional to the contribution of participants in the war effort. In 1235, the aristocrats who led the conquest of Ibiza and Formentera agreed that all movable and se movente booty taken would be used to cover the costs of the campaign in terms of men and material. By se movente booty they meant, no doubt, the indigenous population, who could be used to compensate for the money invested in men, ships, horses, equipment and food. That implies their reduction to captivity —their conversion into a commodity.

Given that the population figures for madīnat Mayūrqa (“city of Mallorca”) provided by the sources are rather implausible, various estimates have been made, which have yielded results between 14,000 and 50,000. Most scholars agree on a figure around 20,000; Pau Cateura is rather conservative, estimating 15,000 inhabitants for the madīna and between 30,000 and 35,000 for the whole island. More recently, Antoni Mas has presented an even lower figure, calculating approximately 14,000 inhabitants for the madīna; the figure is the result of multiplying the known number of houses by four. If the calculations are made on the basis of cultivated land, the population of Ibiza, with its known 170 hectares of irrigated land, could have been estimated at no more than 3,000 people.

34. quan tots els factors demogràfics constituïents fossin favorables (“when all the constituent demographic factors were favourable”). Barceló, Miquel. “Pròleg negre i roig”, Els barrancs tancais. L’ordre pagès al
said to be composed of approximately 350 hectares of irrigated land. Assuming that all of them were being cultivated, this yields a population of approximately 6,200. Valencia was 44 hectares in size and was surrounded by over 1,200 hectares of huerta, and the population at the time of the conquest is deemed to have been approximately 20,000. This is, no doubt, a very crude attempt at historical demographics; my only intention is to suggest that the existing population figures for madinat Mayūraq may be too high.

In contrast, the host mustered by the king is better known, as the record is much more precise in this regard: it included approximately 700 knights and 8,000 infantrymen. This army sailed to Mallorca on board 150 large ships —vessels, taridas, galleys, galiots and buces— and many more smaller ones, according to the Llibre dels fets. If they made only one journey, large ships would have carried an average of 60 men, plus the crew, horses, gear and food, which seems plausible.

As such, there were around the same number of soldiers in the invading army as there were potential captives in madinat Mayūraq. Jaume I recounts that, when the final assault took place, part of the besieged population left the city through two gates in the west of the city; and it may be argued that the besiegers deliberately did nothing to stop this from happening in order to make the number of people inside the city more manageable. Similarly, the slaughter that followed the defeat of the last nucleus of resistance, inside the city, can also be interpreted as a method of selectively reducing the number of people to be made captive. I do not think that this action was motivated by the desire to avenge the Montcada, the dead in Portopí. The massacre of defenceless populations was common after long sieges.

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36. Esquileche Martí, Ferran. Els espais agraris i l’estructura social d’una gran horta fluvial andalusina. La construcció i evolució de l’Horta de València entre els segles VIII i XIII. Valencia: University of Valencia (PhD Dissertation), 2015. The current Horta is approximately 14,000 hectares in size.
41. Soto, Ricard. “La conquista de Mallorca...”: 65. It is also true that the king, in the address reproduced in Chapter 68 encouraged his men to avenge the death of the two aristocrats.
This massacre sent waves of terror through the surviving population. In Ibn ʿAmīra’s words “they seemed drunk, although they were not”. 43 This extreme violence must have facilitated the management of the survivors. 44 Many years earlier, the Pisan poet who narrated the Catalan-Pisan attack against Ibiza referred to the attitude of the captive inhabitants of the arrabal of madīnat Yūbisa, who were driven away like a flock of sheep. 45 Massacres are a popular field of study, but much work is still needed with regard to those of the Middle Ages, especially concerning the wars between Christians and Muslims in the Iberian Peninsula, which remain hidden behind the label of the “Reconquest”. 46 Both the massacre perpetrated in madīnat Mayūrqa and the launch of severed heads with trebuchets are reminiscent of actions during the Crusades. 47 It can be argued that this similarity suggests that the king was merely resorting to a literary topos in his chronicle, but the fact that his account matches those in the Kitāb Tāʾrīḥ Mayūrqa and B. Desclot’s chronicle plays in favour of its veracity. At any rate, the massacre fitted well with the declared targets of the conquest: to eliminate and destroy the indigenous population —a common practice of Settler Colonialism. 48

After taking the madīna, Jaume I’s account provides a clear picture of the voracious appetite of the assailants for the abundant booty available. The spoils were so rich that there were no disputes over it, according to the monarch. 49 After months of heavy toil, the besiegers enjoyed the booty unmolested for eight full days, without rallying under the king’s banner. 50 In Bernat Desclot’s chronicle, the debauchery lasted for only two days, while Pere Marsili, in a typical note to his Latin translation

and 195. For Castile, see García Fitz, Francisco. “¿‘De exterminandis sarracenis’? El trato dado al enemigo musulmán en el reino de Castilla-León durante la Plena Edad Media”, El cuerpo derrotado. Cómo trataban musulmanes e hispanos a los enemigos vencidos (Península Ibérica, ss. VIII-XIII), Maribel Fierro, Francisco García Fitz, eds. Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, Estudios Árabes e Islámicos, 2008: 113-166, especially 118-128.


44. The king was aware of the effect of cruelty on the defeated. When he tried to convince his noblemen to continue with the campaign after the surrender of the madīna, he argued that valría més que ara ab la paor que han los conqueríssem (“it would be better, while fear is on the Saracens, to conquer them now”). Jaume I. Llibre dels fets...: 100-101 (chapter 89).


47. Bradbury, Jim. The Medieval Siege...: 93-127.


49. Jaume I. Llibre dels fets...: 100 (chap. 88).

50. Jaume I. Llibre dels fets...: 100 (chap. 88).
of the *Llibre dels fets*, is more explicit about what it was that kept the king’s men so busy: *direptores discurrentes per domos inveniebant pulcherrimas donnas et domicellas gratissimas*.\(^{51}\) This is not an isolated case; Ambrose recounted the orgiastic, for lack of a better word, behaviour of the Anglo-Norman troops after the conquest of Acre, which took place nearly 40 years before the conquest of Mallorca.\(^{52}\)

Ibn ‘Amīra’s narrative recalls well-known methods of submission, selection, capture, new selection and management of a large contingent of captives. The work vividly describes the furious violence which followed the capture of the city, after the last defenders had been defeated. Men, women, old people and children were left at the mercy of the attackers, who *clavando la espada tanto en los combatientes como en los que no guerreaban*. [...] *Gente desarmada fue golpeada de forma inmiscirorde por cualquiera que empuñase un venablo*.\(^{53}\) Jaume I also mentions this, albeit not in quite so much detail, when he recounts that both horsemen and infantrymen launched themselves against the city inhabitants, *que vint milia no n’hi morissen a l’entrar*.\(^{54}\) According to Bernat Desclot, this was no uncontrolled rage; some of the invading army, at least, regrouped, defeated the last defenders, and then proceeded to slaughter anyone in their path.\(^{55}\) Ibn ‘Amīra spares us no details, recalling that new-borns, children and pregnant women were also butchered. Rich ladies were also attacked, and their *frente era arrastrada por el suelo*, a euphemism that probably refers to rape —something which is also discreetly mentioned by Pere Marsili.\(^{56}\)

The king provides no details concerning the fate of the captives during the days in which his host was allowed to enjoy their booty. Ibn ‘Amīra claims that *se reunió a los prisioneros y cubriéndose la tierra con todos ellos hasta el punto de que su aglomeración a la de un gran ejército semejaba*.\(^{57}\) As noted, the initial killings, although seemingly indiscriminate, were probably a first step in the selection of prisoners. The confused inhabitants of the city allowed the captors to gather them in a single place in the

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53. “thrust their swords both into soldiers and civilians. [...] Unarmed people were struck with no mercy by anyone carrying a weapon”. Ibn ‘Amīra al-Mahzumī. *Kitāb Tā’rīḥ Mayūrqa...*: 114.


56. “foreheads dragged upon the ground”: Ibn ‘Amīra al-Mahzumī. *Kitāb Tā’rīḥ Mayūrqa...*: 114. The whole quote is: ¿cuánta mujer de clase pudiente vio cómo su frente era arrastrada por el suelo? (“How many wealthy women saw their foreheads dragged upon the ground?”).

57. “the captives were mustered until it was impossible to see the floor, so numerous they were; they resembled an army”: Ibn ‘Amīra al-Mahzumī. *Kitāb Tā’rīḥ Mayūrqa...*: 114-115.
madīna without resisting. It is impossible not to recall the system used in Malaga in 1487.58 At this point, Ibn ’Amīra alludes to a second selection, brought about by the cold and the rain to which the captives were exposed. According to his account, more people died of exposure than had been killed previously.59 This second selection was, however, not intended, but forced upon the captors by the logistic problems generated by such a large contingent of prisoners. At any rate, the elements must have killed the weakest among the captives. Ibn ’Amīra also mentions hunger, and so does Jaume I when he claims that those who were unhappy with the distribution of the booty justified their actions by saying morim de fam aquí.60 These conditions soon led to epidemics, aggravated by the prevailing conditions of privation.61

After the rigours of the siege and the joy of the loot, many members of the host were in a hurry to proceed with the distribution of the booty and leave Mallorca, which most of them did, against the wishes of the king.62 This method —reaching the military objectives, distributing the booty, and returning home— was usual practice when it came to cabalgadas, as has been noted by James F. Powers.63 The king, however, conceived the expedition against Mallorca as an act of conquest, and not a piratical raid, and tried, without success, to delay the distribution of booty, for he was aware that, otherwise, it would be nigh impossible to keep the army from disbanding before he could conquer the rest of the island. If we stick to the above-mentioned figure of 30,000 inhabitants for the whole island, this was no mean target, even if we discount the dead and captured after the fall of the madīna. We shall return to this later.

3. The fraudulent auction

In his Llibre, the king recalled the problematic distribution of booty that followed the conquest of the madīna.64 No doubt, the king was interested in providing a detailed account, in order to underline the error committed by his nobles in not

58. According to Fernando del Pulgar, the captives were held in pens: é mandáron que todos los Moros é Moras de la cibdad saliesen de sus casas, y entrasen en dos grandes corrales que son en el alcazaba, baxo de ciertas torres, de las quales estaban apoderados los Cristianos (“forcing all the Moors to leave their houses and enter the two large pens in the fortress, under the towers, which were manned by Christians”). Pulgar, Fernando del. Crónica de los señores reyes católicos Don Fernando y Doña Isabel de Castilla y de Aragón. Valencia: Imprenta de Benito Monfort, 1780: 322.
60. “We are dying of hunger, here”. Jaume I. Llibre dels fets...: 101 (chapter 90).
61. Jaume I. Llibre dels fets...: 103 (chapter 92).
64. Jaume I. Llibre dels fets...: 100-102 (chapters 88, 89, 90 y 91).
following his command. According to the *Llibre*, the lords presented themselves to the king and asked him to proceed to the auction of captives and other property (*dels moros e de la roba*). We may surmise that this was a widespread feeling among all members of the army, and not only among the nobles. Interestingly, at this point no mention is made of the houses and land, although the city and its buildings were, in effect, occupied by the invaders. Bernat Desclot recalls that a 1,000-day indulgence was granted to whoever volunteered to rid the city of corpses, which were dragged away by mules and horses. It is also interesting that the fact this unpleasant task was carried out by the captives themselves goes unremarked. According to William of Tyre, the Temple of Jerusalem was also cleaned of corpses by captives, in 1099.

The king tried to delay the auction and thus take full advantage of the military success obtained in the *madīna* by attacking the mountainous areas of the island. In vain, he insisted that the enemy was terrified, and that they must not lose momentum. According to Jaume I, the main lords —Nuno Sanç, Bernat de Santa Eugènia, and the Bishop and chaplain of Barcelona— were so obdurate because they wanted to cheat the rest of the army. The magnates asked the king how the distribution was to be executed, and the king answered, by *quadrelles* (“gangs”). This did not please the lords, who insisted on having the booty distributed promptly before marching again against the Saracens. They insisted that this could be done in eight days, and that later they would go for the enemy and conquer them: *después anem sobre els sarraïns de fora e conquiram-los*.

In the meantime, the booty could be kept safe aboard the galleys. Despite this assurance, the auction took up the whole of Lent. The king claims that he discovered their plot, but was unable to make the lords yield, for which reason he consented to proceed with the distribution of the booty, but not before warning them that they would regret it later. This is a crucial point because the events proved the king right. On top of this, the king was forced

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67. This explains the mentions of occupied and empty houses in the *Llibre del repartiment*. I do not think that any of these houses were occupied by native inhabitants of the island. Riera Frau, Maria Magdalena. *Evolució i topografia de madīna Mayūrq*. Palma: Ajuntament de Palma, 1993: 105, makes a good point, arguing that the mention of occupied and unoccupied houses referred to their state of preservation.


70. Jaume I. *Llibre dels fets...*: 100-101 (chapter 89).

71. “After that, we could go against the Saracens outside, and conquer them”. Jaume I. *Llibre dels fets...*: 100 (chapter 89).


to help the lords, after they found themselves besieged by the discontented troops in the Almudaina.74

The distribution of booty by *quadrelles* recalls the *quadrilleros* analysed by James F. Powers.75 These municipal officials were in charge of distributing the booty obtained during the *cabalgadas* launched by local militias during the 12th and 13th centuries. The *quadrilleros* kept written records of the participants and their military equipment, as well as of the loot,76 which was distributed according to the weapons carried by each combatant; wounds and other accidents were rewarded with a bonus. In Mallorca, after the death of the Montcada, the king promised to compensate for losses (for example, of horses and gear): *E negun perd un cavall ni neguna altra cosa, nós la us esmenarem.*77 Josep Torró explains the distribution system unsuccessfully advocated by Jaume I before his lords, who gained an undue advantage with the system of inventory, assessment and adjudication that was finally implemented.78 In his account of the expeditions sent by the Catalan Company, more than 70 years after the conquest of Mallorca, Ramon Muntaner succinctly describes such a distribution: *E l’endemà fém encant dels cavalls e dels presons e d’acò que haquem guanyat. E partim de guany per cavall armat divuit perpres d’aur, e per cavall alforrat catorze, e per peó set; e així hac cascun la sua part.*79 In addition, soldiers were assigned a payment, based on their equipment and role. Every item was carefully assessed in terms of cash before being bought by the combatants themselves or the merchants that followed the army. The *Llibre dels fets* mentions the retinue of merchants that accompanied, and funded, the royal host.80 The presence of these merchants is also attested by the treaty between the king and the republic of Genoa, signed as soon after the conquest as late June 1230, in the presence of the Genoese legate Andree de Cafaro.81

The booty must have been publicly exhibited. The auction of captives and other property was based on their evaluation in monetary terms.82 At least, each member

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74. Jaume I. *Llibre dels fets...*: 102 (chapter 91).
76. Powers, James F. *A Society Organized for War...*: 103.
77. “Should anyone lose a horse or something else, I’ll compensate him”. Jaume I. *Llibre dels fets...*: 80-81 (chapter 69).
79. “And next day we had an auction of the horses and of the prisoners and of what we had taken and we had, of the booty, eighteen gold hyperpers for each armed horse and fourteen for each light horse and seven for each foot soldier, so that everyone had his share”. Soldevila, Ferran, ed. *Les quatre grans cròniques...*: 864-865 (chapter 224). Ferran Soldevila (Soldevila, Ferran, ed. *Les quatre grans cròniques...*: 985, note 2), rightly points out that Muntaner was the Company’s purser, and thus he knew the distribution systems well.
80. Jaume I. *Llibre dels fets...*: 95 (chapter 82).
of the army could use their pay, based on armament and their military role, not unlike the system described by Muntaner, to bid at the auction. However, it is worth noting that the evaluation of the booty in cash terms, the adjudication of lots, and the distribution of the proceeds in cash was little more than a theoretical construct. Despite the constant reference to value in monetary terms, coined money was not used as profusely, beyond being a unit of account, as these abundant references suggest. It is for this reason that keeping accounts was so important, and most members of the army were left at the mercy of the magnates car ne sabien més que·ls de la ost as the king had foretold. Disappointed by the outcome, knights and footmen (the poble) ganged together to sack the house of a nobleman. The king interceded, but the mutineers insisted on having their fair share of the loot. In order to appease the malcontents, the king threatened them while promising to clear the accounts and give them their share: els dixem que comptariem, e puis dariéem llur part. In conclusion, the royal chronicle claims that the authority and ability of the king allowed him to solve the problem created by the greed of the nobles.

4. Saracens as incentive

On two separate occasions, the magnates who had disembarked with the king referred to the booty to be distributed, and both times the captives were mentioned first: els sarràïns e la roba. How could the king think about continuing with the conquest, taking captives, when they already had several thousand prisoners in their hands? In fact, the lords were in a hurry to distribute the loot and return home with the proceedings. The movable elements were problematic to store, as the king himself admitted when he recalls that his own share was moved from the Almudaina to the Báb Gumara, under the vigilant eye of the Templars. Hence the lords wished to have their part stored in the galleys. The human booty (moros or sarràïns) had maintenance costs, and supplies were insufficient, and thus the value of the captives was decreasing by the day. The situation was made even worse by the epidemic that struck the city.

83. “for they were craftier than the rest of the army”. Jaume I. Llibre dels fets...: 100-101 (chapter 89).
84. The Llibre dels fets refers to footmen as homes a peu or those a peu. The use of the word poble in the chronicle begins in this section of the book. Later, the term is used in the sense of “people”. In this case, the chronicle clearly distinguishes between poble and knights, so the word is used to refer to footmen.
86. “I told them that we would count, and that everyone would get his share”. Jaume I. Llibre dels fets...: 102 (chapter 91).
88. Jaume I. Llibre dels fets...: 102 (chapter 91) and 100-101 (chapter 89).
89. Soto, Ricard. “La conquista de Mallorca...”: 68.
When Hugo de Forcalquier, master of the order of Saint John of Jerusalem arrived with fifteen of his knights in Mallorca, no later than 1 March, the city had already fallen. Despite this, Forcalquier asked for one part of the booty for his order. The lords disagreed, claiming that the booty had already been distributed, and that most participants in the conquest were already home.\(^90\) In this instance, the king’s pressure worked, and the Hospitaller made an additional petition for some movable property and houses. The nobles used the same argument as they had previously to reject this request, saying that nobody was going to give away what they already thought was theirs.\(^91\) If the dates provided by the sources are correct, this means that the booty, both movable property and real estate, had already been distributed by 1 March.\(^92\) Despite this, the intercession of the king procured the Hospitaller some land, several houses in the city, and, as movable loot, two of the Muslim king’s galleys, which were wintering at the dry dock. This grant, however, included no captives, who appear to have already been adjudicated and dispatched by sea. This did not deter Forcalquier, who eventually got his captives by taking part in the cabalgadas launched against the refugees seeking shelter in the Artà mountains, where, according to the *Llibre dels fets*, 2,000 people were captured.\(^93\)

There are no records or mentions of the shipping of booty, which must have begun soon after the Christian host set foot on Mallorca. It seems unlikely that the mighty fleet put together by Jaume I remained idle in the bays or on the beaches for the duration of the campaign. The king claims that, during the first three weeks of the siege, soldiers and sailors slept on board their ships, as though the ships were simply sitting off the coast, in front of the Christian camp. The *Kitāb Tāʾīr Mayūrqa*, in contrast, says that the ships were used to cut the lines between Mayūrqa and Manūrqa.\(^94\) Their activity must have been frantic, no doubt launching expeditions against the remaining islands and bringing in supplies. I suspect that, on their trips to the continent, they must have loaded captives, who were hard to manage and costly to maintain during the siege. However, the evidence left by these trips is very faint. It is known that, after the auction, Nuno Sanç took to the sea on two galleys and another vessel for an expedition against the Barbary coast. Soon afterwards, he was back in Mallorca with the king. Around the same time, Pero Cornell travelled to Aragón to fetch 150 knights to continue with the campaign.\(^95\) As noted, the master of the Hospitallers arrived in Mallorca with 15 knights after the conquest of the city.\(^96\) Rodrigo de Lizana and Atón de Foces also left soon after on board one of the

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\(^90\) Jaume I. *Llibre dels fets*...: 105-106 (chapters 95, 96).
\(^91\) Jaume I. *Llibre dels fets*...: 107 (chapter 97).
\(^93\) Jaume I. *Llibre dels fets*...: 111 (chapter 103).
\(^94\) Jaume I. *Llibre dels fets*...: 83 (chapter 69) and 100 (chapter 89). Ibn ‘Amīra al-Maḥzumī. *Kitāb Tāʾīr Mayūrqa*...: 119-120.
\(^95\) Jaume I. *Llibre dels fets*...: 103 (chapter 92).
\(^96\) Jaume I. *Llibre dels fets*...: 105 (chapter 95).
taridas used by the invading army, and two leños to carry supplies. A record from 1233 attests to the shipping of a cargo of flour between Marseilles and Mallorca. Maritime traffic, therefore, must have been very intense. A few years later, in 1237, the king recalled seeing in Salou many ships that delivered supplies to Mallorca.

5. Conquer and dominate

Escaping from an island is hard, if not impossible. History is full of examples, the most recent of which, in the case of Mallorca, dates to 1936. In his account of the wreck of a Genoese ship, which was deporting the almojarife of Manûrqa and his people to the coast of Barbary, Muntaner provides another. The confrontation between Jaume I and his noblemen reveals different priorities, as well as stressing the importance of movable property and captives for those whose priority was to get rich. Since they could not escape the island, the noblemen were able to postpone the capture of the remaining inhabitants until the booty had been distributed: ‘ Afterwards, we shall go against the Saracens who are outside, and we shall conquer them’ was their disrespectful retort when the king became impatient.

It is known that the inhabitants of the countryside mobilised soon after the Christian arrival; the local contingent was led by a qa’id, probably the Ifantilla (Fatīh Allāh) mentioned in the Llibre dels fets. According to the Kitāb Tūrīh Mayûraq, this mobilisation was the initiative of the peasants themselves. After getting together, they asked the emir for a commander, but they contested the emir’s appointment without success. This text demonstrates the ability of the peasantry to organise and to put themselves under the orders of the state’s authority, as well as to communicate with the city, despite the siege. According to Jaume I, these volunteers numbered 100 horsemen and 5,000 infantrymen, but were defeated by Nuno Sanç and the Count of Empúries, charging at the head of 300 knights. Fatīh Allāh’s head was lobbed inside the madīna with a trebuchet. Bernat Desclot gives a different account of this event. According to him, the mobilisation of the peasantry followed the emir’s command, who was in communication with the refugees in the mountains. This would have taken place after the events involving Ibn ʿAbbād, of which more below. After this army was defeated, the siege became harsher. According to Desclot, it was then that Fatīh Allāh (Fatitlà) left the city to organise the resistance in the mountains and pester the besieging host, which he successfully did by stalking and

killing Christian stragglers. In order to put an end to this situation, a royal host fell on him, slaughtering all his men. After this, the king ordered the heads of the enemies, 412 in total, be lopped inside the city.

Jaume I, Desclot and Ibn ‘Amīra’s accounts demonstrate that the besieging host could detach units from the main army and undertake special missions. These detachments also left the army to forage and loot, which was fully in line with the military tactics of the period. In 1213, the foraging parties detached from the army encircling Baeza did not manage to find enough supplies to feed the army, and the siege had to be lifted.

Finding fodder for the horses was a tedious but critical task, which occupied a large number of men, probably the servants mentioned by Desclot. Therefore, although these detachments were not specifically mentioned in the accounts of the siege of Mallorca, except under those instances in which they were sent to defeat an enemy force, we can safely assume that foraging and looting expeditions had taken place since the beginning of the siege.

In my opinion, these expeditions, rather than any of the reasons put forward by other scholars, would explain the fact that the besiegers were partially supplied by the local population. In his characteristic mystical style, Jaume I refers to a character known as Ben Aabet or Benahabet (identified as Ibn ‘Abbād) was a ‘Saracen angel’, because he agreed on feeding the army when supplies were running short. In consequence, many authors have qualified Ibn ‘Abbād as a

105. Jaume I. Llibre dels fets...: 79-80 (chapter 67). According to the chronicle, during the actions that followed the disembarkation of the invading army, Pelegrí d’Atrocillo left with four knights and saw the ‘old man’ (the šaij, the king), with 20 horsemen, in a place where there was water. This was not a cabalgada as such, simply a small group that straggles off the army in order to find some loot, seek water or pester the enemy. Bernat Desclot claims that some nobles were disgruntled because they had not participated in the first battle, and entered the woods in the hope of finding some fugitives; later, after the battle where the Montcada were killed, the woods witnessed a similar chase. Desclot, Bernat. Crònica...: II 99 (chapter 35) and 2: 106-107 (chapter 37).
108. Jaume I. Llibre dels fets...: 84 (chapter 71).
110. On the king’s style, see Cingolani, Stefano Maria. La memòria dels reis. Les quatre grans cròniques, des del segle X fins al XIV. Barcelona: Editorial Base, 2008: 53-54.
111. This character seems to be the same person who appears in Declot’s Chapter 45 inviting Nuno Sanç to spend Christmas in his house of Pollença. Mallorcan and Spanish historiography has generally referred to this Ibn ‘Abbād as a collaborationist. Some have claimed that he was related to Nuno Sanç, and founder of the Bennàssar of Mallorca, a fact that, as Josep Maria Quadrado pointed out long ago, is not supported by the evidence. (Quadrado, Josep Maria, ed. Historia de la conquista de Mallorca...: I, 143, note 1). At any rate, Quadrado failed to fully silence the myth of the collaborationist rewarded with
collaborationist and a traitor, beginning with the *Kitāb Tārīḥ Mayūrqa*, which labels him an apostate and a tyrant. Why did Ibn ‘Abbād do it? The most obvious answer is that he was trying to improve his chances, betraying the besieged. Some authors allude to the hostility between the ruling Almohads and the local population. Bernat Desclot, however, provides us with a significant piece of information that could go a long way to explain Ibn ‘Abbād’s actions in a different light. The chronicler claims that Ibn ‘Abbād sought the pact with the king to achieve *pau e treves*, a fact also reported by Ibn ‘Amīra who wrote that he wanted *conseguir la tranquilidad*. According to the *Llibre dels fets*, Ibn ‘Abbād came to the king to parley on behalf of his people, who according to Bernat Desclot were the inhabitants of 800 houses located in the mountains. There is little doubt, therefore, that he was a šaij. Following the *Kitāb*, Ibn ‘Abbād and his people did not have peace or tranquillity when he reached the king, and it is certain that this state of affairs was the responsibility of the Christian host. For Jaume I, this peace and tranquillity could only be bought at a price in food for his army. It seems reasonable to assume that Ibn ‘Abbād’s people had been disturbed by the foraging parties detached from the army in search of supplies. In his negotiations with Ibn ‘Abbād, Jaume I had the upper hand, and was in a position to put a price on the tranquillity of Ibn ‘Abbād’s people and to demand a guarantee that the terms would be met: a number of hostages who, according to Desclot, were relatives of Ibn ‘Abbād (bons hostatges de lurs fils e de lurs files). Ibn ‘Abbād was in a weak negotiating position, and was forced not only to pay the price but also to leave the hostages, which left him completely at the mercy of the king. In exchange, Ibn ‘Abbād asked the king for insignia that could be wielded to signal the king’s protection. Later, he even requested two *batles christians* (Christian representatives of the king) to settle for good in his territory, keeping it safe for the king. This suggests that looting continued despite the pact, and Ibn ‘Abbād and his people decided to make their submission to the Christian king even plainier, by accepting the rule of the king’s men. It is even possible that the hostages were put

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117. “Good hostages, taken among his sons and his daughters”. Desclot, Bernat. *Crònica...*: II, 111 (chapter 39). This chronicle illustrates well the role of the hostages in guaranteeing an unequal pact, in Chapter 118. For the role of hostages, see Davies, Robert Rees. *Domination et Conquest...*: 47-65.
to work during the siege; Bernat Desclot claims that, when the king had the corpses of Fatih Allāh and his men decapitated, this grisly task was executed by the *sarraïns paliers*.118 This was the degrading beginning of their captivity. As such, I think it unlikely that the pact between the king and Ibn ‘Abbād is the result of internecine conflicts among the Andalusis, and much less evidence for collaborationism, treason or apostasy, but rather simply extortion on the part of the Christians. Jaume I provided food for his men at the point of a knife, in a reduced version of the same system that inspired the payment of *parias* and which was to bear much fruit yet, including the domination of Manūrqa.119

6. ‘E depuys anem sobre els sarraïns120

By the time the city was taken, the country dwellers had long fled from the areas that could be reached by *cabalgadas* and sought refuge in the mountains. According to the *Llibre dels fets*, however, no time was lost and new expeditions were launched from the city.121 What seems to have been the king’s first *cabalgada* had to desist from attacking the mountains of the Serra de Tramuntana because of the danger posed by the large number of refugees there. As was the case during the conquest of Valencia, the king always tried to avoid launching an expedition that could not guarantee a number of captives proportionate to the number of troops involved.122

After discarding the Serra de Tramuntana, the monarch asked the scouts who had warned him of the danger for another target, so he would not have to return to the army in shame and with empty hands. Except for the king’s host, armed bands had to compete for places in which captives could be taken. Scouts and the information they possessed were, therefore, very valuable, and hence their reluctance to tell the king what they knew. Finally, the king took them to the side and forced them to speak out, using his royal authority: *manam-vos per la naturalea que havets ab nós que digats veritat*.123 After a suitable target had been established, the host left for a group of caves in the Artà mountains. On the way there, Pero Maça and his men left the main party and took 500 Saracens somewhere else, while the king took

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118. Desclot, Bernat. *Crònica...*: II, 118 (chapter 40). *Paliers* were Saracens sheltered by the king’s mantle, a metaphor of the king’s protection. Torró, Josep. “De bona guerra...”: 462.
120. “after that we could go against the Saracens outside”: Jaume I. *Llibre dels fets...*: 100 (chapter 89).
121. Jaume I. *Llibre dels fets...*: 103-104 (chapter 93) and 108 (chapter 99).
122. Jaume I. *Llibre dels fets...*: 170 (chapter 188) and 175 (chapter 196).
123. “I command, because of the duty you have with me, to tell me the truth”. Jaume I. *Llibre dels fets...*: 108 (chapter 99).
1,500 captives in Artà. These figures are much more reliable, although the 10,000 cattle and 30,000 sheep mentioned in the king’s chronicle are clearly too high.124 In any case, this was a rich booty for 35 knights and several hundred footmen. This expedition took place in late March 1230. The excavation of the rock-shelter of Puig d’en Xoroi has provided dramatic archaeological evidence for these events.125

This was the opportunity to take captives for those who had not been present in the conquest of madīnat Mayūrqa.126 In fact, all the evidence suggests that captives had become an important incentive for new recruits, after most of the army returned to Catalonia and Aragón.127 The king had called for more knights to reinforce his host in Mallorca, while Cornell travelled to the Peninsula to fetch 150 Aragonese knights, and there were also the 15 Hospitallers and their master. In addition, the king summoned Atón de Foces and Rodrigo de Lizana.128 These nobles owed obedience to the king, but were also swayed by the possibility of booty. We have already noted that this was an important incentive for the Master Hospitaller, who also insisted that the king did not reach any pact which spared the refugees in the caves, who were, according to his wishes, left no option other than death and captivity.129

The attack on the caves illustrates how difficult it was to subjugate the remaining inhabitants of Mallorca, who were entrenched in the most remote areas of the island. On the other hand, for the attackers the situation was advantageous, in that the groups of refugees formed what I have termed a “self-supporting reserve of captives”. Harassed and cut-off from supplies, the Andalusis had to draw from their dwindling food reserves. The stratigraphy of a rubbish pit found in the rock-shelter of Puig d’en Xoroi illustrates the progressive deterioration of the living conditions of these refugees.130 According to the Llibre dels fets, mountain areas and castles sheltered as many as 20,000 refugees.131 Even if we deem this figure excessive, it seems likely that they numbered in their thousands.132 Despite this, Jaume I determined that they did not pose a threat, and left the island for Tarragona on 28 October, leaving Bernat de Santa Eugènia and Pero Maça in charge of Mallorca.133

126. Pero Maça, on the other hand, seems to have been present in the siege. Soldevila, Ferran. Les quatre grans cròniques...: 54, 224, and note 1, in chapter 103.
127. Jaume I. Llibre dels fets...: 103-104 (chapter 93) and 106-107 (chapter 97).
128. Jaume I. Llibre dels fets...: 103-104 (chapter 93) and 105 (chapter 95).
130. Barceló, Miquel; Kirchner, Helena; Riera, Mateu. “Primavera de 1230...”: 229-239.
132. The Kitāb Tāʾrīḥ Mayūrqa claims that the refugees were included in a census, and that this led to the formation of an army of 16,000 footmen.
133. Jaume I. Llibre dels fets...: 112-113 (chapter 105) and 120 (chapter 114). Bernat de Santa Eugènia governed the island with the aid of a council, see Pastor, Plàcid. “Mallorca, 1230-1232...”: 18. The king was in Tarragona by 30 October: Miret i Sans, Joaquim. Itinerari de Jaume I ‘el Conqueridor’. Edició
The king left with the enigmatic assertion that his parting was good for both those who remained and for himself.\textsuperscript{134} He needed to look after the rest of his kingdom, so his departure seems necessary, but what was the benefit of his leaving for those that stayed behind? Was he referring to the possibility of acquiring more booty without having to put a portion aside for the king?

7. ‘Tan gran guerra’\textsuperscript{135}

There is some discrepancy in events, and their temporal sequence, in the \textit{Llibre dels fets} and the \textit{Kitāb Tāʾrīḥ Mayūrqa}. According to the latter, after the death of Abū Ḥafs ibn Šayrī, on 15 February 1231, the defenders in the mountains lost cohesion and the Christians could finally “exterminate, imprison and tie them”, and sell them as captives “for a ridiculous price”.\textsuperscript{136} This account is followed by the last section of the book, which deals with the fate of the Muslims who resisted in castles.\textsuperscript{137} These defenders did not lay down their arms, asking to parley with Jaume I and to surrender with conditions. According to the \textit{Kitāb}, they were allowed to keep one-third of their money, and were given authorisation to go elsewhere. These conditions, however, concealed a trick. The agreement said nothing about the cost of the ship that was to take them from the island. In the event, those who had something had to pay for those who did not, and they were all dispossessed. The \textit{Kitāb Tāʾrīḥ Mayūrqa} does not specify what the final fate of these ships was.

According to the order that Ferran Soldevila proposed for the events recounted in the \textit{Llibre dels fets}, the king was in Barcelona in March or April 1231 when he received the visit of Bernat de Santa Eugènia and Pero Maça. They bore the news that the Saracens in the mountains, after being harassed for the entire winter, wished to surrender to the king in person.\textsuperscript{138} As noted, the \textit{Kitāb Tāʾrīḥ Mayūrqa} dates the death in combat of Ibn Šayrī in mid-February 1231.\textsuperscript{139} The \textit{Llibre dels fets} mentions a Xuaip as \textit{cap e sènyet} of the Muslims who were defending the mountains.\textsuperscript{140} Xuaip and Šayrī must, therefore, be the same person.\textsuperscript{141} The king set sail from Salou in mid-

\textsuperscript{facsímil} Barcelona: Institut d’Estudis Catalans, 2007: 569. At this point, we must follow the succession of events reconstructed by Ferran Soldevila (Soldevila, Ferran. “La segona i la tercera estades de Jaume I a Mallorca”. \textit{Recerques i comentaris. Història de Catalunya}, Barcelona: Llibreria Catalònica, 1929: I, 169-191).

\textsuperscript{134} Jaume I. \textit{Llibre dels fets}...: 113 (chapter 106).
\textsuperscript{135} “Such great war”. Jaume I. \textit{Llibre dels fets}...: 119 (chapter 113).
\textsuperscript{136} Ibn ‘Amīra al-Maḥzumī. \textit{Kitāb Tāʾrīḥ Mayūrqa}...: 121.
\textsuperscript{137} Ibn ‘Amīra al-Maḥzumī. \textit{Kitāb Tāʾrīḥ Mayūrqa}...: 122.
\textsuperscript{138} Jaume I. \textit{Llibre dels fets}...: 120-121 (chapters 114, 115).
\textsuperscript{139} Ibn ‘Amīra al-Maḥzumī. \textit{Kitāb Tāʾrīḥ Mayūrqa}...: 120.
\textsuperscript{140} “Leader and lord”. Jaume I. \textit{Llibre dels fets}...: 107-108 (chapter 98) and 119 (chapter 113).
April and, after arriving in Mallorca, accepted Xuaip’s surrender.\textsuperscript{142} It is not easy to explain that Santa Eugènia and Maça left the island unsupervised only to bring this news to the king. It is likely they wanted to ensure that the merit of the victory was shared by both. The knights also assured Jaume I that he could go to Mallorca without a host, as there were plenty of men on the island.\textsuperscript{143} Clearly, they wanted no more knights with whom to share the spoils that, presumably, the surrender of Xuaip was about to produce. The king himself provides the proof that the troops at hand were too few, when explains the idea of lighting fires at Capdepera in order to give the impression that his army was much larger.\textsuperscript{144} Under this threat, the rulers of Manúra surrendered and agreed to pay tribute. This interpretation is also in agreement with Ferran Soldevila’s sequence of events. On Jaume I’s third trip to Mallorca, however, the king did summon his host, in order to confront the Tunisian threat.

The \textit{Llibre dels fets} recalls that the pact with Xuaip applied to 3,000 combatants and 15,000 civilians, including men (perhaps old men), women and children.\textsuperscript{145} Xuaip and four of his relatives were rewarded with land, arms and horses, so they could live their lives with honour. The remaining Muslims were to ‘populate the land’, and those who refused would be left for the king to do as he would. The king explained his decision to sign a pact in Mallorca by saying that ‘such great war’ against the resistance had made colonisation impossible to date.\textsuperscript{146} The fact that the pact (\textit{pleit}) was put in writing (\textit{en cartes}) indicates, if the chronicle is to be believed, that the king renounced the possibility of making captives of the 18,000 surrendered Muslims. On the other hand, 2,000 Muslims refused to surrender and continued the fight in the mountains, until they were reduced and captured by the host deployed in Mallorca to counteract the Tunisian threat.\textsuperscript{147}

Given the difficulty of having to defeat all defensive redoubts, the pact presented the king with an easy way forward and a chance to consolidate the conquest and proceed with the urgent repopulation of the island. Once the Muslims had left their refuges, the Christians could simply ignore the conditions of the pact. Whether the king was aware of this or not is really of little consequence. The violation of pacts was a recurrent event during the conquest of Valencia.\textsuperscript{148}

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{142} Jaume I. \textit{Llibre dels fets...}: 119 (chapter 113).
\bibitem{143} Jaume I. \textit{Llibre dels fets...}: 120-121 (chapter 115).
\bibitem{144} Jaume I. \textit{Llibre dels fets...}: 123-124 (chapter 120).
\bibitem{145} Jaume I. \textit{Llibre dels fets...}: 119 (chapter 113).
\bibitem{146} Jaume I. \textit{Llibre dels fets...}: 119 (chapter 113).
\bibitem{147} Jaume I. \textit{Llibre dels fets...}: 126 (chapter 124). Was there a real threat, or was it just a rumour or an excuse to finish off the conquest and rearrange the distribution of Mallorca? For the reorganisation of the 1230 distribution see Pastor, Plàcid. “Mallorca, 1230-1232...”: 18. The threat appears to be confirmed as real in ARM, ECR 342, f. 42v, 2 October 1241. With this document, Legetus de Seva authorised Bernat Aimeric and Simon Milgraverutinus to take from the King of Tunisia all that he had taken away (\textit{abstulit}) from him, during his depredations of Christians.
\bibitem{148} Torró, Josep. \textit{El naixement d’una colònia...}: 54.
\end{thebibliography}
This version of the story of the pact rests on the assumption that a substantial number of free Muslims remained on the island after the conquest of the city; this version was adopted by Elena Lourie and, more recently, by David Abulafia. There is little doubt that the pact existed, but the fact that the ‘letters’ conveying this have been lost, is revealing. Ricard Soto questioned the efficacy of the pact—a hypothesis supported by the Kitāb Tāʾirīh Mayūrqā, which describes the pact as un arreglo en el que había engaño. At any rate, there is another piece of evidence for the way the king interpreted the pact, and for what he understood as ‘populating the land’. On 8 July 1231 Jaume I gave Ramon Serra, comendador of the Templars, a piece of land, the former property of Abceya Aonzi, in the hamlet of Inca. In the same document, the king also donated 30 casatos sarracenorum for the order to use as their own, under the protection of the king. In the document, the king warns against harming these Saracens and their property. According to Elena Lourie, these Saracens could have been sent from the Templar’s Peninsular possessions. I do not think there can be much doubt that these are some of the Muslims surrendered by the pact between the king and Xuap, as confirmed by the chronology of the donation.

As noted, the king returned to Barcelona in the last week of July 1231. On 29 September, he exchanged the lordship of Mallorca for the County of Urgell with Peter, prince of Portugal. This agreement took several months to come into effect. In April 1232 the king was warned that the king of Tunisia (Abū Zaqqariyā Yahyā, 1228-1249) was planning to disembark in Mallorca. After some hesitation and after receiving further reports, the king summoned those of his vassals who had participated in the conquest of Mallorca and owned land on the island. After this, Jaume I left for Tarragona, where he made his will, dated to 15 May. The king hired ships to transport 300 knights, 250 of whom joined him on the Peninsula, while 50 waited for him in Mallorca. Peter of Portugal also joined the party. By 7 July they were on the island, making preparations to repel the Tunisian attack. After a fortnight had gone by with no news from the Tunisian fleet, the host relaxed somewhat and took the opportunity to defeat the last foci of resistance in the


152. Lourie, Elena. “Free Moslems...”: 626.

mountains. On 15 July, Jaume I returned to Catalonia via Menorca. It is likely that the construction of the Bastida del Teix was conceived during this third trip; (La Bastida) quam dominus rex ibi fecit, according to the first document that mentions it, dated to October 1233.

The document by which the 30 casati were donated to the Templars is illustrative of the way in which the king interpreted the pact with Xuaip. Furthermore, later, in summer 1232, supported by the presence of a large armed host on the island, the king would most likely not have respected the pact. Muslims were not safe on the island, despite the pact. The episode of Ibn ‘Abd proves it, as does the kings’ warning in the donation document involving the casati: nobody was to take their property, detain them, or harm them in any way. The impact of the Christian depredations on the island is clearly expressed by the number of free Muslims documented by Ricard Soto for the period 1240-1260. It is true that, in 1240, the Peter of Portugal, who at the time was lord of Mallorca, was compelled by Gregory IX to stop populating the island with Saracens, which in any case should be sub jugo servitutis positos. However, these Muslims were captives taken by expeditions launched from Mallorca by maritime companies ad lucrandum contra sarracenos.

8. Conclusions

The long and problematic distribution of the large booty resulting from the sack of madīnat Mayūrqa led to the disbandment of the host that had taken the city on the last day of 1229. Most of the members of the royal army returned home with their loot, or its value in cash. Captives feature prominently in the two main chronicles and that by Bernat Desclot. The accounts of the assault describe methods of selection, by which non-apt individuals were eliminated (children, the elderly, the weak). The first selection was by slaughter, and the second, after the survivors had been gathered together, by exposure —it was January— and then hunger and, eventually, sickness took more people. At this point, the island was only half conquered, and few Christians remained. Under these conditions, demand for captives in Mallorca must have been limited, making it harder to turn them into cash at auction. As a

155. “it was made on the orders of our lord the king”: Pérez Pastor, Plàcid; Reynés Trias, Antoni. “Es Teix: formació i explotació d’una possessió de muntanya a la serra de Tramuntana de Mallorca (s. XIII-XX)”, VIII Jornades d’Estudis Locals de Sóller i Fornalutx (Sóller, 8 y 9 de noviembre de 2013). Muro: Institut d’Estudis Balears, 2014: 319-346.
156. Soto, Ricard. “La conquista de Mallorca...”: 74.
result, most of these captives must have been shipped elsewhere. Both the royal host and the captives left the island.

We have few details concerning the fate of these captives, but we know of the presence of Genoese merchants in Mallorca who, no doubt, played an important role in turning these captives into a commodity and in transporting them. A gap in Genoese notarial documentation, however, means we stray into the realms of hypothesis. At any rate, documents in Marseilles attest to substantial commercial traffic between the northern and southern shores of the west Mediterranean during this period. We also know that, around this period, a large contingent of Muslim captives, consisting of tens of thousands of people, was transported from Sicily to Lucera, on the Italian peninsula.\(^{159}\) We also have a detailed account of events in Menorca in 1287. Finally, it is worth pointing out that the fleet mobilised for the conquest of Mallorca was equal to transporting the captives taken in the city (perhaps 5,000 or 6,000).

Despite the fact that the large number of captives taken in \textit{madīnah Mayūrqa} may have contributed to decrease their price—as the \textit{Kitāb Tāʾirh Mayūrqa} insinuates—these captives were still rich prey. Revealingly, in the account of the \textit{cabalgada} against Artà conveyed by the \textit{Llibre dels fets}, captives are mentioned first. In later records, captives always were mentioned first and foremost in all descriptions of booty. On his second trip to Mallorca, however, Jaume I accepted the conditional surrender of Xuaip’s people. In any case, the king’s account is clearly designed to justify his acceptance of a pact despite his solid military advantage. The normal thing would have been to make captives of these people, without accepting conditions or leaving them any option, and this was, in fact, the preferred stance concerning the refugees in the caves, who were only allowed to choose between slavery and death. The chronicle was written to explain why the king had now decided to act differently.

In the account of his third trip to Mallorca, the capture of the last insurgents and their, seemingly discreional, distribution among members of the royal army feature prominently. This was a large army, summoned following the threat—or with the excuse—of the Tunisian offensive. The king rewarded his men with captives. The precision of the \textit{Llibre dels fets}, which specifies that the captives were distributed in order to “populate the land” reveals the king’s wish to accelerate the colonisation process.

Trade in chattel slaves continued. After the inhabitants of Menorca fell under the protection of the 1231 pact, two of the most important lords in the kingdom, Nuno Sanç and Peter of Portugal, requested royal authorisation to conquer Ibiza and Formentera. The first royal permit expired in 1233, before the conquest had been achieved. Soon afterwards, these two lords, along with Guillem de Montgrí, brother of Bernat de Santa Eugènia, joined together in order to undertake the conquest together.\(^{160}\) By 4 June 1235, \textit{madīnah Yābīsa} was already under siege, and the city

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finally fell on 8 August. This action resulted in the capture of more captives. In the meantime, the conquest of Balansiya progressed fast, and captives are again mentioned firstly in the description of cabalgadas conveyed by the Llibre dels fets.

There were different ways to despoil the indigenous population of their land. Turning the captives themselves into booty was an effective system, so much so that they totally disappeared from Mallorca and, eventually, from the other islands too. The conquest aimed to enlarge jurisdictions, create new manorial properties, and to gain strategic commercial and military positions, but the incentive that drove men to run the risk of war was the prospect of immediate gain, with the capture of movable property and land. During the sack of the island of Mallorca, after the city had fallen, information about the concentration of refugees was precious, and the pacts that theoretically protected the local inhabitants as sarrains paliers were of no value. The expectation of profit outweighed the possibility of punishment for those who violated the king’s protection.

This same pattern repeated itself time and time again, almost without change. As previously noted, captives in Mallorca and Malaga were gathered in an identical manner, despite the fact that the conquest of both cities were separated by more than two-and-a-half centuries. As demonstrated by Charles Verlinden, this consideration of people as commodities (their evaluation in monetary terms and the use of their labour) was transferred wholesale to America, where the system was to acquire continental, monstrous proportions. Mallorca, and the other Andalusi lands, as well as the Caribbean, fall under the aegis of a sentence in which Friedrich Engels referred to colonial Cuba, and was later slightly modified by Jordi Maluquer: És segur que l’esclavitud no és una forma exclusivament antiga; sorgeix en tots o qualsevol tots els llocs on els conqueridors no han trobat habitants nadius —o els han exterminats— i no han aconseguit de promoure la colonització per homes lliures.162


162. “it is certain that slavery is not only a manifestation of Antiquity; it appears wherever conquerors have found no native inhabitants —or they have exterminated them— and have been incapable of attracting free colonists”: Maluquer de Motes, Jordi. “La burgesia catalana i l’esclavitud colonial: modes de producció i pràctica política”. Recerques. Història, economia, cultura, 3 (1974): 83-136, especially 87. Friedrich Engels’s quote is a fragment from a letter to Karl Marx, dated 22nd December 1882: “It is certain that serfdom and bondage are not a peculiarly medieval-feudal form, we find them everywhere or nearly everywhere where conquerors have the land cultivated for them by the old inhabitants”. It has been taken from the prologue of Eric J. Hobsbawm to Marx, Karl. Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations. London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1964: 59. Jordi Maluquer de Motes followed the Spanish translation: Marx, Karl. Formaciones económicas precapitalistas, translator Gregorio Ortiz. Madrid: Editorial Ciencia Nueva, 1967: 94-95, in which “serfdom and bondage” is translated as slavery.