A NOTE ON THE THRAX OF EUPHORION: SH 15.II.1FF.

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ABSTRACT

This paper tries to consider the Archaic or Classical origins of Dike or dike, starting by Hesiod and Aeschylus or some indexes which show its religious meaning, and its evolution from the “religious” treatment to the “exemplum” by Euphorion in his “curse poem” the Thrax. Although the probable ironical nature of the Thrax would suggest that Dike is a literary rather than religious figure, it is difficult to support so, because the poem may well be something of a mock-complaint on either a dog or another pet animal, but this does not imply that Dike, as a figure, is not serious. The relevant lines of the poem (SH 415.ii.1ff.) are quite serious in themselves: Dike and Themis are introduced as powerful divine entities regulating human life. But references to the possible “dog” in the Thrax may involve “l´énigme par fragmentation” and this shows the importance attached to “enigma” in Greek texts, as well as in the Thrax, according to Hurst’s proposal.

KEYWORDS: Euphorion; Thrax; Dike; “enigma”; exemplum.

SOBRE EL TRACIO DE EUFORÍON: SH 415.II.1FF.

RESUMEN

Este artículo trata de considerar los orígenes arcaicos de Dike o dike, comenzando por Hesíodo y Esquilo, así como por algunos índices que muestran su significado religioso. También se analiza su evolución desde la consideración “religiosa” de dicha diosa hasta el exemplum citado por Euforión en su Tracio. Aunque la naturaleza probablemente irónica del Tracio sugeriría que Dike es esbozada como una figura literaria más que religiosa, es difícil pensar así, habida cuenta de que dicho poema puede tener más bien una mock-complaint sobre un perro u otro animal doméstico, pero esto no implica que Dike, como figura, no sea una figura seria. Las líneas más relevantes del Tracio (SH 415.ii.1ss.) son más bien “serias” por sí mismas: Dike y Temis son introducidas como entidades divinas poderosas que regulan la vida humana. Con todo, el trabajo enumera y analiza las referencias a un posible “perro” u otro animal doméstico en el Tracio y el alcance de “l´énigme par fragmentation”, hipótesis que demuestra la importancia que se atribuye al “enigma” en textos griegos (y quizá en el Tracio, aunque el autor lo ponga en entredicho), según la propuesta de A. Hurst.

PALABRAS CLAVE: Euforión; Tracio; Dike; “enigma”; exemplum.

The Hellenistic author best known for his “curse poems” (arai) is Euphorion of Chalcis, whose output enjoyed a very important fortune among Greek and Latin poets in the ancient world. His 17 testimonia and 210 fragments have filled up a lot of pages, but the meaning of Dike and other religious vocabulary and the deities of the polytheistic religion and way of life, revolving around the Greek Gods, have not been sufficiently studied. This paper tries to consider the Archaic or Classical origins of Dike or dike, starting with Hesiod or Aeschylus, among others, and its evolution of the treatment of “religious” or the “exempla”
by the Hellenistic poet Euphorion of Chalcis (in his “curse” poem the *Thrax*), where Dike, as a hypothesis, has become more “literaturized” or has an important literary treatment, and may not provide as much in the field of Greek religion as it does in his poetry as a whole, but drinks from many sources (among them the peripatetic tradition or Orphism). So, in this paper, thanks to a previous paper regarding Dike by Kolde (2006), I will try to track, in part, the literary and religious importance of Euphorion’s treatment of Dike described especially by Hesiod, and how the poet of Chalcis uses Dike as religious and serious reference or framework in the probable ironical *Thrax*, but also as ornamentation for a possible disquisition on a “religious” pseudoimage (Clua 2013b).

In recent times scholars have begun to argue that the presence of gods in Hellenistic poetry may be something more than a bare tribute to Greek culture of the previous ages. In the current Greek religion and mythology manuals or the works of the specialists (see Bonnefoy 1981, Buxton 2004, Calame 1988, Delienne 1989, Duchemin 1995, Edmonds 1990, Diel 1980, not forgetting the more specific about Greek religion such as Bremmer 1999, Brui Zaidman and Schmitt Pantel 1992, Burkert 2005, without obliterating, of course, the inveterate manuals of Nilsson 1967, or the excellent manual by García López 1975, in which many read with fascination the course of the Eleusinian Mysteries, or another one from Otto 1973, and the latest by Chirassi Colombo 1983), references to Dike and Euphorion are few and far from the issue that concerns us in this paper.

Dike, a daughter of Zeus and Themis (Hesiod), who has been arbitrarily outraged by mortals, makes an unusual choice for modern eyes. She rushes to her father’s, Zeus, sides and proclaims against what her name embodies: the injustice of men. But in Hesiod, according to Pucci,

the exact meaning of “dike”, Dike, or “dikai” is not easy to determine. In many cases it is difficult to deny dike an abstract meaning bordering the idea of justice, as we saw in *Erga* 9. But this abstract and moral meaning, strongly supported by many scholars, is vigorously denied by others, as M. Gagarin (1973: 81). (Pucci 1977: 50-51)

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1 It must be noted that these emphasize to a greater or lesser extent, a guidebook approach to archaic and classical religion, without neglecting, obviously, the Hellenistic and Imperial religion. Specifically, Nilsson’s volume II, among others, is extensively dedicated to “Die hellenistische und römische Zeit”, and a clear example in this respect. However, rather than comprehensive manuals, religious study of these periods has mainly consisted in “segments” of research, dedicated to distinctive religious trends (mystery, eastern-and eastern-mystery-Judaism, Hermeticism, Gnosticism, Dionysianism, Mithraism, Judaism, the “syncretism” in Egypt and elsewhere, the emergence of Christianity, etc.), which have attracted much attention. Nor can we forget some general titles, as those already mentioned, such as Martin (1987) or Tripolitis (2002). It is also worth referring specifically to the relatively recent and work of García Teijeiro (2005) on Hellenistic religious syncretism.
And Pucci adds on the word “dike” and the meaning of the concept of “justice”:

Does dike means “justice”? To pose the question in these terms is misleading in many ways, especially because no precise equivalent can exist between cultures as different as the Hesiodean and ours. Yet we can try to define the sort of “justice” that Hesiod implies. The connection we have established between dike, dikai, and thurogh suggests a stronger moral connotation in Hesiod than in Homer, since in Hesiod truth is part of a decisive constellation of moral and religious priorities and values. In fact, the word dikai is repeatedly accompanied by the attributes “straight” or “crooked”, which refer [...] to a whole moral code (truth, memory, sweetness, the Muses, protection of Zeus, etc). [...] As concerns dike, the word is never termed “crooked”, but a few times it is termed “straight” (ll. 18. 508, 23. 580; Hes. Erg. 224, fr. 174). In Erg. 224, dike is qualified as “not straight”, but here dike is overcome and abused by the bad kings. (Pucci 1977: 51)

As revenge or punishment of Dike, the same Aeschylus mentions her in Ch. 311, and we need to mention Sophocles’ Antigone to remind us of the infernal Dike, that is to say the Erinyes, charged with vengeance of the dead and the punishment of attacks upon one’s own family. But Dike appears in Greek religious tradition as already mentioned in the Odyssey, XI 218, or in Aeschylus, Ch. 193. But even Plato makes a reference in Leg. 705e, and in many other works. Perhaps he has the highest number of quotes appearing in dictionaries, but who dared mention Dike as justice personified for the first time were perhaps Hesiod and Aeschylus in Sept. 662.

On the other hand, in Works and Days (= Erga) Hesiod replies to, in short, the same spirit that the poet expressed in his Theogony: his interest in the kosmos and his kosmos (order), that only Zeus safeguards, though perhaps with the help of Dike, but tamed under men. This is what characterizes men when they deal with injustice, they neglect Dike and scorn work. At the beginning of his theogonic poem, Hesiod introduces the subject of contention (the “eris”) as the cornerstone of the poem and this lineage of contention is two-fold, although positive and beneficial to the common mortals. It is also much more unfortunate and reprehensible and only produces “quarrels and wars” (vv.11-26). In Hesiod (Erg. 256-260) we read about Dike, that she is ἥ δὲ τε πάρθένος ἐστι Δίκη, Λέκω ἐκγεγαυλαία,/ κυθή τ’ αἴδοι τε θεών, οὐ Ολυμπὸν ἐχοῦσιν./ Καὶ ὅ ὀπότ’ ἀν τις μὲν βλάπτῃ σκολιῶς ὀνοτάξων,/ αὐτίκα πάρ Διό πατρί καθεξομένη Κρονίωνε/ γηρένετ’ ἀνθρώπων ἂνικον νόσον, ὅφος ἀποστίη.

While the term δίκη in archaic Greek Literature can mean both “the exercise of power” or “justice”, Aeschylus especially restablishes the “Goddess of Reason”, destroying or transforming the Erynies in the Eumenides. But sometimes, δίκη (“justice”) appears as a common name and can be found paired with ισχυς “strength”:

ὅπως γὰρ ισχύς συνωγούσι καὶ δίκη,
ποιά ἕνωσις τῶν δικαιοτείχων;
(fr. 381 R)
According to the *Index Hesioideum* which “*confect*” Paulson in 1962 (23), we read the following items of *Dike* and *dike/dikai*:

*dike*: Sc. 85, Op. 192, 217, 278, Fr. 198, 2, -kes Op. 213, 275, -ke Th. 484,
*Op.* 9, -ken Op. 39, 239, 249, 269, 272, 279, 283, 712, Fr. 268, -kon Op. 264,

And if we read the *Lexicon Hesioideum (cum indice inverso)*, elaborated by Hofinger (1973) in 1978, we read the following and abundant entries of *dike / dikai* or *Dike*:

*dike*: [2 Th., 23 Op., 1 Sc. B, 3 Fr]. Le nom désigne deux choses différentes: 1. l’usage, l’habitude, le mode de vie, la manière d’être; 2. la justice, qu’il s’agisse du concept d la justice “faite”, c’est-à-dire envisagée. Dans ses applications. Dans ce dernier cas, *dike* peut signifier: 1. la sentence qui, chez Hésiode comme chez Homère, a trait à un procédure formelle; 2. l’administration de la justice, l’activité des tribunaux; 3. une satisfaction positive, s’il s’agit d’un droit particulier, ou negative, s’il s’agit d’un châtiment […]. 1. l’usage, l’habitude, le mode de vie, la manière d’être; 2. La justice, qu’il s’agisse du concept ou de la justice “faite”, c’est-à-dire envisagée dans ses applications.

And about *Dike* in Hofinger’ *Lexicon Hesioideum (cum indice inverso)* we read a living embodiment of what was a concept:


There already exist some excellent works on the literary allusiveness and the known *variationes* on Hesiodic texts, such as the the recent one by Gallego (2004: 35), studying the Hesiodic hypotext in Aratus, but also, it’s interesting the remark of Cusset (1999: 329) who states: “Comme Hésiode, Callimaque et ses contemporains écrivent à la manière d’Homère auquel ils empruntent beaucoup, mais ils cherchent aussi à se démarquer. Cependant, la perspective d’Hésiode n’est pas celle des Alexandrins”. Indeed, the Hellenistic poets recovered Hesiod for the sake of scholarship. Therefore, recuperating Hesiod, what differentiates it from Homer is primarily thematic and didactic. And it is only in the frame of the Hellenistic appreciation – and idealization – of Hesiod that Euphorion’s Hesiodic themes (and the allusions to Dike) can be properly understood (see Reinsch-Werner 1976 and Fakas 2001 or Konig 2010).

The nature of Euphorion’s *Chiliades* is unclear and the title ambiguous (Clua 1992: 46-53). It was perhaps influenced by Pythagorean belief that the vengeance of the gods will be noticed during a timespan of a thousand years, but I wish to highlight that τίσις appears in Euphorion’s *Thrax*. Elsewhere we have noted (Clua 2013b: 225) that Pythagoras himself corroborated this belief, according to Iamblicus (*vita Phyth.* VIII, 42) and the plot describes the predictions
used for their intent, each extensive and meticulous. Orphism also distrusted earthly justice and pointed to justice beyond the grave. Nevertheless, I don’t agree to see a single Pythagorean tradition in place of a locus communis regarding the ancient oracles of Euphorion’s Chiliades. Moreover, there was also a platonics and peripatetic tradition that, in order to fight against hedonism, collected anecdotes, numerous individual examples or of entire peoples “… sui quali era piombata la punizione divina per la loro vita irreligiosamente dedita al piacere. Tale corrente è documentata in particolare da Eraclide Pontico, discepolo di Platone e di Aristotele, con gli scritti περὶ ἡδονῆς e περὶ δικαιοσύνης”.

Euphorion knew of this platonics and peripatetic “tradition”, at least he recognizes and takes into account the expertise of Lacides and Pritanis. However, the “voluptuous” poet, facing the damage he considered pleasure and at odds with the peripatetics, assumed this theme as an exemplum for an entirely different matter: forbode “potential” thieves of his possessions (if this is not a ludus perhaps as we shall see) and what would await them in the future.

The second part of the Thrax, which becomes really important to shed light on the problem that centers the attention of this note, is divided into three segments of different length. The first one, comprising 13 verses, consists of an appeal to a god in order to reinstate Eirene, Themis and Dike among men, as well as of a list of crimes punished by Dike. The second one, of 9 verses, consists of two examples of the Talion law of different length, and the third one, of four verses, forms the conclusion of the poem.

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2 In fact, Pythagoras’ words harmonize with the knowledge we have of Euphorion’s Chiliades given that in the Suda: διὰ χιλιῶν ἐτῶν χρησμῶν ἀποτελεσθέντας. A possible Pythagorean tradition is linked, either as a reference point, or dependent upon, the biblical tradition and Orphism. It appears to be a common point, indeed the Elegy to the Muses by Solon reminds us that the justice of the Gods will always take place and in the event of a delay in this justice then the sentence will be carried out upon the children or subsequent descendents, in comparison with the biblical Exodus (33, 7-11, 34, 58.28) prayers devoted to God, mirror the Pythagorean tradition.

3 Even Barigazzi (1948: 34-64) seems to neglect any reference to Jewish tradition and Orphism in his work. Critics, in general, have been reluctant to point this comparison.

4 Barigazzi (1948: 34-64, esp. 57), one of the greatest connoisseurs of Euphorion poetry, said (although his appreciation has not lost its freshness nor meticulous comprehension), that there was a platonics and peripatetic “tradition”. Moreover Treves (1965: 161) accepted as a plausible theory of Barigazzi (in cited paper) about ideological and philosophical reconstruction of the poem the Chiliades, controversy in the field of the anti-Epicurean and Peripatetic scholars, of whom apparently Euphorion was a disciple. But it must be added, like Magnelli (2013: 189) remarks, that Treves placed every extant fragments of Euphorion in a definite period of the poet’s career, reconstructing a “Macedonian” phase of his poetry, a “Thratic / Ptolemaic” one, and finally a “Seleucid” one.

5 See De Cuenca (1976: 8) on these names and, simultaneously, on the chronology of Euphorion.
Things get complicated when we think about the following hypothesis, namely, a possible 
paignion in Euphorion’s Thrax and a pseudo-justice at Dike’s 
hand, corroborated by Lloyd-Jones’ suggestive lines, quoted because they seem 
convincing:

The best specimen of his art that we possess is the Florentine fragments of the Thrax. It 
shows several touches of humor, but not all the critics have perceived the lightness of the 
poet’s touch. If the murdered person spoken of at the end was human, his sad fate is 
spoken of in a way that seems curiously perfunctory. But if it is, as I suspect, a pet bird or 
beast, no difficulty arises.

But what crime did Dike have to punish? What is the link existing 
between the title of the poem and its contents? In addition to that of Lloyd- 
Jones, several hypotheses have been made: a dog, as Lloyd-Jones claims above; 
the poet’s friend, that is, the astrologer Protagoras (Van Groningen); a friend 
and addressee of the imprecations of the friend’s murderer (De Cuenca), or “ni le 
meurtrier , ni la victime, ni les circonstances du crime ne sont clairs, c’est 
qu’ils n’intéressaient pas Euphorion; quant au titre, il propose de ne pas en voir 
la raison dans le choix ou la localisation des mythes; il désignerait plutôt 
l’ennemi d’Euphorion” (Clua 2005) which Kolde (2006) quotes. Indeed, I think 
that the poet from Chalcis needed to test, before his “enemies” (fictional or 
real), to secure the effective implementation of the curses that he uttered.

Therefore, those responsible for carrying out revenge, in the peripatetic 
tradition, were the gods, the deities. In Euphorion, however, and throughout 
imprecatory genre it is Dike and the gods, and not only the gods as Barigazzi 
states (Barigazzi 1948: 58). Indeed, Dike like Themis, appear in Euphorion’s 
Thrax, punishing crimes (with γρήγορος foot), as we mentioned at the beginning 
of the paper with allusion to Kolde, who remarked the “oxymoron” (obvious 
contrast) with the ὦκα in the Euphorion’s Thrax verse. If in Hesiod Dike is a 
πάρθενος, in Euphorion, her passing is γρήγορος. This adjective, underscoring 
the length of her career, which lasts since the dawn of time, reminds the reader 
of the goddess’ birth, which is explained in the poem about the origin of the 
world as is narrated in the Theogony (Kolde 2006: 155). Indeed, besides this 
remark, I choice the adjective γρήγορος which has a concurrent reading devised 
by Lobel: this word cannot be read in the papyrus, yet Lloyd-Jones (SSH 56) 
regarded it a good emendation. As Kolde (2006: 57) says:

La coniunctura γρήγορος ἵχνος, formant une antithèse avec l’adverbe ὦκα au vers 48 (du 
Thrax), et l’expression λαυψήξα... γοῦνατ(α) au vers 55 en livre un autre example. Les 
tensions que nous avons constatées plus haut entre l’ambiance comique des hypotextes et 
celle, tragique, de notre poème peuvent, également, être versées au dossier de 
l’ironie. (Kolde 2006: 57)

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We should remember that, in the Arai, Artemis is placed in charge of pursuing, with his arrows, the thief of the cup, and it is also Artemis who avenges (in fr. 131 Cusset and Acosta-Hughes = 129 Clua = 68 Lightfoot, and fr. 136 Cusset-Acosta-Hughes = 134 Clua = 82 Lighthood, possibly belonging to the Chiliades). This shows two things: the introduction of a divinity, Dike, by Euphorion, that was exclusive to the imprecatory genre. Also this reference to Dike is not unique, as the poet of Chalcis chose other divinities who were also responsible for avenging crime. Here Euphorion doesn’t abandon platonic and peripatetic tradition. Therefore, Euphorion, with his oxymoron (as an obvious contrast, with the ὠκα in the Euphorion’s Thrax verse), leads us to believe that the reference to Dike has become more “literaturized” and may not provide as much in the field of Greek religion as it does to his poetry as a whole, but sips from many sources (the peripatetic tradition, even Orphism), and its important allusion to Hellenistic religious history, following Genette’s ideas on the “palimpseste” (Genette 1982: 4), it may shed light on a subject that the same Sappho is still supporting, like Aeschylus or Euripides (Her. 104), the appeasement of their spite.

In conclusion, Dike plays an important role among the religious vocabulary and the deities of the polytheistic religion and way of life, but also in Euphorion. But can we talk about hesiodic hypotext? Scholars have taken it as another example of “irony”, as Kolde points out, quoting Hurst (2003: 233-246):

L’ironie place notre auteur (Euphorion) aux côtés de Théocrite et de Callimaque, dont il est également proche par sa narratologie. Les touches allusives lui permettent ainsi non seulement de ne retenir du récit que les éléments strictement nécessaires à l’économie de son texte, mais également de créer au niveau de la trame, une “énigme par fragmentation”, sans doute responsable, à côté des nombreuses énigmes lexicales, de l’obscurité souvent reprochée au texte. (Hurst 2003: 233-246)

Therefore, references to the the possible “dog” in the Thrax of Euphorion could involve “l’énigme par fragmentation” and this may show the importance attached to “énigme” in Greek texts, according to Hurst.

Although the probable ironical nature of the Thrax would suggest that Dike is a literary rather than religious figure, it is difficult to think so, because the Thrax may well be something of a mock-complaint on either a dog or another pet animal, but this does not imply that Dike, as a figure, is not serious. The relevant lines (SH 415.ii.1ff.) are quite serious in themselves: Dike and

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7 Un palimpseste est, littéralement, un parchemin dont on a gratté la première inscription pour lui en substituer une autre, mais où cette opération n’a pas irrémédiablement effacé le texte primitif, en sorte qu’on peut y lire l’ancien sous le nouveau, comme par transparence. Cet état de choses montre, au figuré, qu’un texte peut toujours en cacher un autre, mais qu’il le dissimule rarement tout à fait, et qu’il se prête le plus souvent à une double lecture“.


9 See Hurst (2003), who shows the importance attached to enigma in Greek texts.
Themis are introduced as powerful divine entities regulating human life. What is not serious is the end of the poem: “thus I hope that he too, the creature who killed you, will receive punishment”. In other words, Dike is not a metaphor or the like; we may well think that Euphorion’s religious feelings were not very strong, but that not primarily concern the “figure” of Dike. The mentioned notion of “énigme” could be accepted or not, but we could rather speak of play with the reader’s expectations.

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