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## **Rethinking Urban Inclusion**

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## Policies of Inclusion?

# Some Thoughts on the ‘Los Indignados’ Movement, the Emerging of the Neoliberal Penal State and the Criminalization of ‘Being Young’ in Southern Europe

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**Abstract:** A growing reactivity of young people against dominant classes has emerged over recent years in post-industrial cities. This text explores how the so-called ‘European Spring’ is related to the downward mobility suffered by young middle classes from Europe that have been accompanied, at the same time, by the criminalization of ‘being young’ as response of political and financial elites (the ‘Old’) facing the collapse of financial capitalism in Europe.

**Keywords:** ‘Los Indignados’ Movement, ‘European Spring’, social unrest, youth protests, criminalization of being young

## Introduction

Youth movements have usually played a key role in the contemporary social and political evolution of several countries. Youth revolts in French suburbs in November 2005, the so-termed ‘Arab Spring’, the ‘Geração à Rasca Movement’ in Portugal, youth riots that occurred this last summer 2011 in some British working-class neighborhoods, and the ‘Los Indignados’ Movement in Spain may be seen as recent episodes of the history of Europe that would situate youth as agents of social and historical change. Moreover, it would corroborate what Karl Mannheim (1928) and José Ortega y Gasset (1935) suggested about generational succession

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overcoming class struggle as the main paradigm of political and social change in capitalist countries.

However such pseudo-utopian suggestions have not been taken place over the twentieth century. From the late nineteenth century, social and labor movements in Western countries have progressively converged into the struggle for the creation of a new socioeconomic and political order that should mainly benefits working classes. This fact has influenced many scholars who have studied social movements emerged after the World War II by considering them as a collective effort that would seek to promote changes in any direction and by any means. For authors as Anthony Oberschall or Manuel Castells, several social conflicts, including class, race and community conflicts, rebellions, insurrections, revolutions, riots, unrests, strikes, etc. have played a key role in fuelling social movements in Western countries from their process of industrialization (Wilkison, 1971; Oberschall, 1973; Castells, 1977; Álvarez and Escobar, 1992). According to these authors, the success of an urban social movement largely depended on two factors: firstly, the kind of objectives targeted by the movement itself; and secondly, the process of how social basis became an active political force (Castells, 1977; Bettin, 1979). Anthony Oberschall (1973) argued that any social movement must show a very active participation of its members in order to be defined itself as social movement. In parallel, Manuel Castells (1977) defined “urban social movement” as the system of practices born under a certain context that aims to transform – or substantially modify – a certain urban system in structural terms. Castells also pointed out that the strength of such urban struggles as agents of social and political change was conditioned by an interclass-based nature of urban social movements.

From the beginning of the 1980s, urban social struggles began to cover new claims, such as issues on collective identity and space-time quotidianities (Melucci, 1985). Facing the emerging of a post-industrial society in Western countries, Anthony Giddens (1985) identified four kind of new social movements: 1) democratic movements; 2) labor movements; 3) ecological movements, and 4) peace movements. Following Giddens’ suggestions, Brands (1987) defined ‘new social movements’ as those ones which were mostly composed by young middle classes who aimed at influencing public opinion in the continuing search for improving individual, collective life (Klandermans, 1986; Russell *et al.*, 1992). However, the progressive *carnivalization* of public demonstrations and performances played by these new social movements have involved a certain weakness of their social power, losing influence on public opinion. Together with this fact, their legitimacy is often violently denied by the State authorities.

Today’s social protests in Europe have a new face, because a new politicized global generation has arisen over these last years. Such global generation is mainly composed by young people aged between 20 and 35 (Feixa *et al.*, 2002) this so-called *Outraged Generation* is (re)produced largely thanks to virtual social networks, blogging (wordpress®, blogspot®) and microblogging (Twitter®) technologies, constituting the today’s most efficient tools for social and political struggles for NGOs, new social political and cultural associations, neighbors’ associations, informal groups for social justice, ecologists and solidarity groups, etc. (Feixa *et al.*, 2002; Stein, 2009; Reygadas *et al.*, 2009 ; Feixa *et al.*, 2009; Sánchez, 2011). However most works published on this current global youth revolt tend to overlook a very significant issue: the criminalization of ‘being young’ (Castells, 2011) as part of the ‘city securitisation’ politics to socially sanitize the competitive city and thus ensure the process of city branding.

Fortunately, the socioeconomical approach to today’s youth protests has not been marginalized at all. The U.K. newspaper *The Guardian* together with the London School of

Economics has recently published *Reading the Riots. Investigating England's Summer of Disorder* (2011). This book constitutes an outstanding analysis of the recent riots that occurred in August 2011 in several British cities like London, Birmingham, Manchester, Salford, Nottingham, and Liverpool, among others. Its authors strongly underline the fact that the 59% of the arrested people after disturbances occurred in these aforementioned cities came from the 20% most deprived of areas in the United Kingdom. Authors also argue that such disturbances would express a widespread anger and frustration at everyday treatment at the hands of police – this is because of the increase in tuition fees, the closure of youth services and the scrapping of the education maintenance allowance. Furthermore, many complained about perceived social and economic injustices (Rusbridger and Rees, 2011). But, which ones? Unfortunately, very few works have provided some sort of explanation about the evident downward mobility mainly suffered by not only Western middle classes but especially their descendant generation. This process has been pretty significant in the European-Mediterranean countries over latter years (Navarro, 2006; López and Rodríguez, 2010, 2011). This paper explores how the so-called ‘European Spring’ would be related to downward mobility suffered by young middle classes from Europe that have been accompanied, at the same time, by a parallel process: the criminalization of ‘being young’ as response of political and financial elites (the ‘Old’) faced with the collapse of financial capitalism in Europe.

A first exploration on the criminalization of ‘being young’ in post-Fordist societies allows us to suggest that it mainly operates by means of five processes: labor precarization, housing insecurity, financial insecurity, health consequences regarding the criminalization of ‘being young’, and the ‘hyper-securization’ of youth leisure activities. On one hand, the fact of ‘being young’ means that most of young middle and lower classes of Western countries are doomed to accept ‘junk jobs’ which are devoid of any social or labor rights previously conquered by trade unions over the last century. The case of a highly skilled 24-year-old girl reported by Reuters on October 17, 2011, is paradigmatic:

With a masters' degree in publicity, the 24-year-old has been working for more than two years, full-time, in an internship that is starting to feel like it will never end. Paid 300 Euros a month for the same work as the salaried public relations professionals who sit next to her, she doesn't earn enough to move out of her parents' house and her bus pass and lunch expenses eat up most of her pay. But despite feeling her multinational employer is flouting rules that limit the use of worker contracts with no benefits, she's not about to complain to the labor office since she considers herself blessed to have a job at all. ‘Since I was little my parents urged me to get a university degree to find good work. But I'm lucky to have any work at all. There were 30 of us in my graduating class and I'm one of the ones who is doing the best with their career’, Silvia said. She did not want her last name used in case of repercussions at work. (Ortiz and Tisera, 2011)

Furthermore, a labor market featured by high rates in ‘junk jobs’ has hard consequences on the balance of the social security systems in Southern European countries. Moreover, the continuation (still today) of the real-estate bubble in Southern European countries – besides the moderate decreasing of prices occurred over these two last years – together with junk salaries are dooming young people to postpone their individual emancipation. The temporality of their labor life is also reflected in an extreme volatility of their housing

conditions, involving radical changes on the development of a family project. This fact leads to decreasing pension replacement rates for full-career workers, which are fundamental in consolidating a long-termed Welfare State in Southern European countries.<sup>3</sup>

Together with housing precarization and housing insecurity, a significant number of young middle and working classes must face quasi-everyday financial insecurity: many financial companies tend to associate the fact ‘of being young’ with a high risk of becoming defaulters. For that very reason, financial entities obligate them to be guaranteed by their parent’s capital. This provokes a very low rate of entrepreneurship among young people in Southern European countries, which then contributes to lower rates of national productivity (Zalevski and Swiszcowski, 2009). Furthermore, housing, labor and financial insecurity lead to the emergence of mental diseases among young middle and lower classes. As Murali and Oyebo (2004) point out:

It is not just infectious diseases that demonstrate the powerful social-epidemiological correlation; it is also psychiatric conditions, which not only occur at higher rates in the poorest areas, but also cluster together, usually in disintegrating inner-city communities. Money is not a guarantor of mental health, nor does its absence necessarily lead to mental illness. However, it is generally conceded that poverty can be both a determinant and a consequence of poor mental health. (p. 216)

Therefore it should not be dismissed the role that the everyday criminalization of ‘being young’ would play in the emerging of emotional, anxiety, depressive, panic, phobia, obsessive-compulsive disorders, among others. Finally, many authors have warned about an excessive ‘securitization’ of nightlife in Western cities. Video vigilance, aggressive ads including sexualized images of girls and violence between young customers and bouncers feature a nightlife rapidly criminalized by all colours of mass media (Recasens *et al.*, 2008).

Many scholars have avoided deepening on the nature of social and economic injustices fueling recent youth protests in Europe. However some others authors – which are pejoratively labeled as *leftists* – suggest that some reasons would play a key role in fueling today’s social protests (López and Rodríguez, 2010, 2011; Navarro *et al.*, 2011): a) the progressive loss of social rights conquered a few decades ago in a then-favorable macro-economic context; b) the lack of a certain socioeconomic stability which would eventually permit young individuals to plan a family project; c) the privatization, elitization and commodification of public education; d) the precarization of the labor market; and e) the increasing ‘disciplining’ of workforce, obligated to accept either high rates of unemployment or junk jobs (Feixa *et al.*, 2002; Navarro, 2006; López and Rodríguez, 2010, 2011; Navarro *et al.*, 2011).

## **The collapse of the Post-Fordist society: Insecurity, fear, and the response of the ‘young’**

The Outraged Generation dreamt once to be like their parents – in the case that the family union had run successfully – or, in the contrary case, like their parental generation who

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<sup>3</sup> The new strategy adopted by the neoliberal governments of most Southern European countries like Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece is to postpone retirement age in order to safeguard public pension funds.

participated in the transformation of a society of proletarians into a society of owners, which occurred over the second half of the twentieth century in most Western countries. Following what the capitalist production system requires, every North needs its South: Mittle Europe and the Mediterranean area. In that sense, a welfarian social pact emerged after the Second World War in Western countries, except in those under fascist dictatorships (namely, Spain and Portugal). In these two, a fictional pax populis was constructed under conditions of minimum labor incomes, much lower than those in Protestant European countries, which had already begun to register progressive increases of labor income, especially from the beginning of the 1960s.

In the case of Spain, some factors helped to ensure such fictional social peace: decreasing the length of the working day, increasing free time, the institutionalization of holidays for working-classes, and their motorization thanks to mass-production of automobiles manufactured by national automotive industries (SEAT), numerous initiatives of social housing sponsored by the most 'charitable' factions of the fascist dictatorship together with the Catholic Church after the Eucharistic Congress held in Barcelona (1952), etc. But such pax populi came especially by the inclusion of proletarians and their families in the then-newly created national system of social security in 1963.<sup>4</sup> The so-called Spanish economic miracle (achieved thanks to low wages and few social rights) was largely based on the State's advertising campaigns, which promoted holiday apartments in coastal villages. It actually responded to Franco's fascist government strategy in transforming 'Spain, a country of proletarians' into a modern 'Spain, a country of owners'.<sup>5</sup> Housing, work, public health system and social security, public education, family, descendants, automobile, holiday properties... and time to hang out to dance on Saturday evenings over these last three decades and half. And cinema (or football) on Sundays... and for the richest, the Casita Blanca.<sup>6</sup> Who does not want a life like this? However, for the first time in the contemporary history of Spain, middle classes – especially their descendant generation – have begun to suffer problems traditionally associated with the everyday life of working classes. Hence, three terms have recently entered into the quotidianity of the middle classes: Housing, financial, labor, emotional, mental, health insecurity and fear regarding the perception of a no-future scenario for oneself.

Undoubtedly, working classes have circumvented daily insecurities from the industrial revolution, in spite of some difficulties. Different strategies related to housing, the informal economy, family and friendship networks structured in bars, taverns and sports and leisure clubs, etc. have usually helped to working classes to overcome such traditional insecurities determined by the everyday (re)production of class inequalities and social injustice in the industrial city. In Foucaultian terms, it seems that that knowledge has come progressively, being inserted in the bodies of descendant generations of working classes, although it can also be seen as a technique for achieving social and political control and subjugation to the State. In that sense, a first key question to better understand recent youth protests in Europe arises: What kind of knowledge have descendant generation of middle classes for urban survival in

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<sup>4</sup> In the original, Ley de Bases de la Seguridad Social (1963) and Ley General de la Seguridad Social (1966).

<sup>5</sup> This was precisely the main aim of the National Economic Stabilization Plan of 1959 previously cited.

<sup>6</sup> Casita Blanca was the most famous upper class-led whorehouse in Barcelona over the twentieth century. After more than one hundred years offering its services, it closed in February 2011.

times of deep economic difficulties? The great fear of not having an individual answer to this situation made young middle classes take the squares in several cities around the world.

In the third week of May 2011, many young people took plazas in 219 Spanish cities. Besides its urban nature (Nofre, 2012), a common thought blows in the air: nobody can explain why it had not happened before. Many scholars have recently wondered how it is possible that frugality and rebellion – which have fueled numerous popular uprisings throughout the contemporary history of Spain – have been canceled by the desire to return to those days of hedonistic consumption guaranteed by family bank credit. That was precisely one of the first instructions of the Spanish government to bank institutions in the early stages of the current economic and financial crisis: they must avoid, as far as possible, the massive withdrawal of credit cards for families.

The precarization of everyday life, not only of Western young working classes but also middle classes, must be seen as one of the main causes of the ‘European Spring’ and the later movement – beyond the Atlantic Ocean – called #OccupyWallStreet. Faced with these recent youth protests, the State deployed a rhetoric discourse on ‘city-securitization’, ‘zero-tolerance’ politics to socially and politically control the re-emerging of class consciousness in youth after its apparent de-politicization occurred after the youth revolution of May 1968 (Mauger, 2007; Garnier, 2010). This ‘again-politicized’ (and ‘criminalized’) global youth tend to express their demands at central, symbolic spaces of the inner city often affected by urban renewal or gentrification, which would lead one to wonder about the existence of a hypothetical relationship between the renewal of some central ‘spectacle-oriented’ urban spaces – in terms of Guy Debord (1967) – and the ‘zero-tolerance politics’ against youth protesters, who are highly criminalized because they do not fit into the image of a secure, competitive global city (Dangschat, 2001; Zinganel, 2003; Nofre, 2009; Edthofer, 2011).

Facing such a daily scenario, Manuel Castells (2011) warns about the rupture between citizens and politicians. In line with him, Michel Wierkova (2011) points out that “the old way to do politics is gone. It arises a new way, subordinated to individual as well as collective demands crying out for human rights, respect and the recognition of particular identities while not calling universal values into question. Those political parties that do not understand such demands are doomed to disintegration” (no page). He also adds: “Up to now, new social and cultural actors have had more success in questioning politicians rather than weakening dominant economic logics. The social is now placed above the cultural” (no page).

### **French banlieues and the ‘European Spring’: A first simulation of the criminalization of ‘being young’**

A growing reactivity of young people against dominant classes of the inner city has emerged over recent years (Mauger, 2007; Garnier, 2010; Feixa, 2011). Although mass media have drawn some parallels between the French *banlieues*’ revolt in November 2005 (Jaurreau, 2005; Lagrange, 2005; Brossat, 2006; Mauger, 2007) and some episodes of the ‘European Spring’, many scholars tends to avoid drawing parallelisms between both episodes of youth protests. This can be linked to the latest de-politicization of youth studies and the consolidation of the neoconservative research agenda in the Academy and thus the disappearance of concepts such as class struggle or social conflict, which have been gradually replaced by others much more de-politicized such as ‘negotiation’, ‘hybridization’ or even ‘neo-tribalism’ (Maffesoli, 1988). Maybe such ‘decorative sociology’ – in the terms of Rojek and Turner (2000) – has to do with some kind of incapacity to propose a research agenda that

should intend to decode the *nature* of this global youth revolution. The reasons of such incapacity would be clear: without taking ‘social class’ into account as one of the main category of scientific category, no relationships could be established between the youth revolt in French *banlieues* in mid-autumn 2005 and the ‘European Spring’, apparently disconnected. However one of the facts that would allow to establish a common nexus is, precisely, a class-based analysis of the aforementioned criminalization of ‘being young’. But besides the criminalization of ‘being young’ has not been much explored up to now, today’s criminalization of spaces of protest emerges as one of the most visible faces of the neoliberal Penal State (Castells, 2011).

In that sense, youth revolt in several French *banlieues* – when immigrant adolescents and teenagers violently clashed with police in November 2005 (Jarreau, 2005; Lagrange, 2005; Mauger, 2007) – may be considered as the first simulation of such aforementioned strategy of securization of the inner city by means of the ‘zero-tolerance politics’. Moreover, the consolidation of the neoliberal urban governance occurred over this last two decades in many cities around the entire world (Leitner et al., 2007) has involved a transition from a ‘low intensity politics’ of social sanitization of the inner city and its working-class suburbs (Nofre, 2009; Garnier, 2010) to the establishment of a ‘violent politics’ to eradicate perilous ‘social noise’ in the process of urban branding of the elite’s city (Garnier, 2010). This fact would allow us to better understand the key reasons of violent evictions of occupiers occurred in several ‘occupied cities’ like, among others, Madrid (16 May 2011), Barcelona (27 May 2011), New York (19 November 2011) and London (28 February 2012). Such violent evictions constitute the most visible sequel of the *banlieues*’ simulation in criminalizing youth. Or, maybe, has such simulation turned into a real everyday scenario in our post-Fordist cities?

It seems to be so in most Southern European countries, like Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. But what mass media and politicians usually hide – the political meaning of spaces of protest or, in other words, the political power of places (Lefebvre, 1974; DeCerteau, 1984; Agnew, 1989; Hershkovitz, 1993) – should not be overlooked. In such places, those who have neither power nor economic capital and those who sympathize with them create ‘spatiotemporal utopias’ (Harvey, 2000) challenging the exercise of hegemony in central, becoming symbolic spaces where political dissidence is visibilized (DeCerteau, 1984: 36-37). In the case of Spain, the ‘Los Indignados’ Movement occupied central squares where political, social, religious and economic power still today are located. In other words, the Young Generation expresses its contestation against the fact of being doomed to accept a new individual as well as collective ‘No-Future’ scenario. However, how is ‘the Old Generation’ responding to the demands of radical democracy and a better social equity expressed by the Young today?

## **The response of the (old) dominant classes of the inner city against youth protests: A global perspective**

Undoubtedly, police violence has been linked to unrests in working-class neighborhoods of capitalist cities (Davis, 1990). Actually police repression usually provokes protests by increasing solidarity between members of the same – or even different – social groups as in Egypt:

On June 6, 2010, Khaled Said, a 28-year-old upper class youth, had been dragged from a cyber café, and died in police custody. Angry demonstrations had followed, and several youth created a Facebook page

‘We are all Khaled Said’. On November 7, 2010, two 19-year-olds were arrested, and the disfigured body of one, Ahmed Shaaba, was later found in a canal near Alexandria. New rallies to protest police violence were held. (...) When January 25 arrived, tens of thousands of young Egyptians flooded Tahrir Square, spilling out onto Cairo’s streets. In dozens of towns throughout Egypt protestors defied police. ‘It was the happiest moment of our lives. It was the first time we felt it was our country, we were taking it back,’ recalls the Egyptian blogger Mahmoud Salem aka ‘Sandmonkey.’ (Schneider, 2011: 3)

As largely expected, institutional reactions to protests have consisted of systematically abusing those who were voicing their discontent. Unarmed protesters were killed in Tunis and Egypt, tear-gassed in Chile and in the U.S.A. and severely beaten up in Spain, among many other countries as England, Italy, Greece and France, for example. For protesters, it is about reclaiming a better social justice and a better social equity as well. For many neoliberal political leaders, it is about threatening social, economical and political established order, as the today’s Chilean President argues about students marches reclaiming a better distribution of wealth and improvement of the public education system: “So that’s why we spend a lot of energy to make these radicals understand their behavior is anti-democratic” (Sebastián Piñera, in “Chile Rising”, 2012). In line with President Piñera, the U.K. Prime Minister David Cameron asserted – concerning unrests occurred in some England suburbs in the second week of August 2011 – that “gangs were at the heart of the protests and have been behind the coordinated attacks” (in Rusbridger and Rees, 2011). However, the 59% of the England ‘unresters’ came from the most deprived 20% of areas in the United Kingdom, as previously noted in this text (Rusbridger and Rees, 2011).



Police repressing young protesters in Athens (top left), Santiago de Chile (top right), New York (bottom left) and Barcelona (bottom right). Source (1 and 2): “Chile Rising”, Fault Lines, Al Jazeera, January 2, 2012 at 22:30 GMT  
 Source (image 3): Photo by Louise Macabitas, <http://juansantiso.blogspot.com/2011/12/blog-post.html>  
 Source (image 4): <http://carlesdomenec.wordpress.com/2011/05/27/indignats-15-m-barcelona/>

What has been told up to now in this text would suggest the existence of some incompatibility between the social, political and spatial needs for capitalist production and the so-termed ‘the right to the city’ (Lefebvre, 1968). Actually, the anarchist geographer Mark Purcell has recently underlined that the right to the city should be also seen as ‘the right to the participation and mobilization’ and ‘the right to the appropriation’ as well (Purcell, 2003). Such considerations permit us to begin socially, politically and generationally contextualizing clashes between (young) protesters and (old) police.<sup>7</sup> In parallel, Jean-Pierre Garnier (2010) warns about the fact that neoliberal urban governance aims to eradicate the physical, active presence of popular classes in central urban spaces, whereas young working classes as those who do not want consume the ‘ludic city’ (Baptista, 2005) are displaced by means of institutional violence. Hence, the criminalization of protesters occupying central spaces of local power would respond to the strategy of local elites to socially and politically sanitize the inner city according to global competitiveness needs of urban global territories (Harvey, 2008) that are mainly based on the promotion of a ludic, cultural production/consumption, quinary activities and upper classes-led tourism. Hence what does not fit in the sanitized city is violently displaced. As Jean-Pierre Garnier suggests,

Faut-il, comme le font tant de chercheurs soucieux d’élaborer une alternative à la gestion pénale de la nouvelle question social posée par la rébellion d’une jeunesse populaire privée d’un avenir autre que de déréliction, ne discerner, dans l’obsession sécuritaire qui taraude la société française – pour ne parler que d’elle – depuis queleque temps déjà, que le produit d’une manipulation idéologique des gouvernants? Considérer que la focalisation sur l’insécurité, au sens policier du terme, ne vise qu’à dissimuler son origine sociale tout en détournant l’attention des autres formes d’insécurité (financière, professionnelle, résidentielle, alimentaire, sanitaire, existentielle...) dont pâtissent les couches populaires atteintes de plein fouet par les effets dévastateurs d’un néolibéralisme effréné? En déduire que la priorité accordée à la lutte contre l’insécurité ne serait que le corollaire de l’abandon de la lutte contre les inégalités et l’alibi servant à légitimer, en criminalisant la pauvreté, le renforcement constant des mécanismes de contrôle et de répression des nouvelles classes dangereuses? (Garnier, 2010: 223-224)

## Final remarks: Beyond protests

Spain is still today situated in the last positions in investment in social policies among all the EU-27 countries (Navarro, 2006), with the deficiencies of the Welfare State in Spain traditionally being covered by what is commonly known as the ‘family mattress’. The transformation of that former Spain seen as a ‘country of proletarians’ into a modern Spain seen as a ‘country of owners’ certainly permitted an accumulation of capital which has helped descendant generations access public university, complete master's degrees or doctorates, buy their first car, carry out some Erasmus year in Rotterdam, and acquire (unconsciously) a 40-year mortgage. That is to say, their parents have therefore become their guarantors: Are they The Outraged Generation or maybe The Mortgaged Generation?

Today, such family mattresses have almost disappeared. Greece – seen today as an urban and social laboratory which represents the construction of a neoliberal society with junk

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<sup>7</sup> What occurred in Oakland (California, U.S.A.) in the evening of January 28 could allow us to better understand this association, when hundreds of young protesters were arrested: [http://www.insidebayarea.com/oakland-tribune/ci\\_19843263](http://www.insidebayarea.com/oakland-tribune/ci_19843263) (29 January 2012, 4:34 p.m.).

salaries, devoid of welfare state and under the supervision of financial and industrial elites of Mittle Europe for its commercial exploitation – has failed. They did not expect that it was so difficult to manage a defaulted country from the geographical, political, social and cultural ignorance about the cradle of Western democracy. In fact, social unrest and new uprisings appear as critical issues to be addressed by public security policies of Western cities, as NATO's Urban Operations in the Year 2020 reports, suggesting militarization of public space as a response to assure the governance of the neoliberal city.

Undoubtedly, elites of several worldwide countries have begun to express some fear. Actually, the great revolutions in Western countries that have occurred over the contemporary age have been usually launched by intellectual factions of middle classes because they had sufficient means to carry them out. Hence, mass media editors from Spain are not focusing their attention on the response to the crisis offered by working classes – no longer oppressed, but resigned and resilient. Their main concerns lies with the hypothetical contestation the descendants of middle classes, often better educated than elites themselves, could make facing a non-future scenario imposed by their previous generation. Here, the most worrisome of all of what has been treated up to now: since the #1215M protest (or celebration) day was a failure, is the 'Los Indignados' Movement a simulation of critics as Jean-Pierre Garnier (2010: 66) suggested for May'68 in Paris? In short, which are the real channels through which youth unrest will be channeled in a mid-term scenario?

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