The Catalonia of the 10th to 12th centuries and the historiographic definition of feudalism

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Abstract

The historiographic evolution of the concept of feudalism, from its formulation in the 17th century until today, has affected Catalonia differently. In the last quarter of the 20th century, it reached a prominent position as a paradigm of the mutationist model. The numerous sources still conserved, coupled with the enrichment of interpretative perspectives, facilitate a revision. However, it should be undertaken cautiously in light of the pitfalls of the documentation itself and the hermeneutic difficulties. Nonetheless, revision is a challenge that cannot be neglected given that the events that took place in the northeast of the Iberian Peninsula between the 10th and 12th centuries heavily conditioned the subsequent history.

Key words: feudalism, historiography, institutions, Late Middle Ages

Introduction

The fit between the heuristic and the hermeneutic, the indispensable underpinning of any historical research, has grappled with a specific challenge when clarifying what happened in the northeast of the Iberian Peninsula between the 10th and 12th centuries. For several decades at the end of the 20th century, the Catalan scenario was enmeshed in a historiographic controversy, not so much because it was discussing Catalonia but because the country became the paradigm of one of the ways of explaining feudalism, precisely when the stances were most at odds with each other. Now we can regard this stage as over because we have been able to interpret what happened in the counties in the northeast Iberian Peninsula very precisely thanks to the divulgation and study of the extensive documentary resources conserved along with a properly contextualised analysis. The time seems to have come when we can talk about it with a long enough perspective to ensure the necessary contextualisation. However, at least three lines crisscross, demanding particular caution when studying this episode even today.

First of all, we need a proper overall interpretation of the coeval events, with their respective traits, in the rest of Europe, which have themselves been subject to quite a bit of historiographic controversy, as Jean-Louis Paul claimed: “on ne sait plus si la féodalité a existé, si elle finit avec l’Ancien Régime comme l’ont supposé les traditions républicaine et marxiste, ou vers le xiiie siècle comme a pu l’affirmer une exégèse juridiste de coutumes magistrales”. When these words were written in 1997, the reflection could not avoid being affected by the debates on our capacity to grasp history and its orientation, which occupied the turn of the 21st century. In the quest for new historiographic pathways, different avenues of revision questioned the capacity for objectivity in understanding the past, thus accentuating the suspicion, in the subject of study concerning us now, that the ideological framework might have affected our understanding of the late mediaeval sources, especially filling many of its silences by tending to construct a historiographic edifice sometimes overly indebted to the preceding interpretative design.

Secondly, this is crossed with the particular way in which the lands that later came to be known as Catalonia were unified. The counts settled in their domains especially after AD 877 and ceased participating in the political evolution of Aquitaine and the warring episodes to the north linked to the dynastic conflict and the incapacity for joint government that enmeshed the Carolingian unity in seigneurial and territorial fragmentation. The counties in the northeast of the Iberian Peninsula gradually drifted towards autonomy, to such an extent that each count became the repository of supreme authority, as proclaimed by Count Hugo I of Empúries in 1019: “potes-
The proper remedy is grounded on the fear of forgery was clearly present throughout the entire medieval communities, such as the monasteries in Alا؝, Gerri and Lavaux or the cathedral of Huesca, which was joined by similar strategies in all kinds of documentary typologies, and even in projections on the mediaeval roots based on the most disparate interests in modern centuries. The fear of forgery was clearly present throughout the entire Middle Ages, the proper remedy is grounded on the birth of the science of diplomacy, and from an early date historiography has warned about its inherent perils. However, historians have not infrequently fallen into the traps, either because they are very well contrived or perhaps because the scope of the risk of forgeries has not been properly calculated. Thus, nonexistent geographies and anachronistic scenarios have been accepted, jeopardising deductions about the evolution of society.

This is coupled with the checkered history of how the documentation has been conserved, plagued by grave episodes of utter destruction, fragmentation and dispersion in recent centuries, particularly throughout the 19th century and until 1939. The documentation that has survived until today is perilously partial, which is why studying it demands caution when attempting to project or extrapolate from it, especially in territorial, chronological or social terms. The very conservation of the documents has even fostered other difficulties in studying them, linked to their preservation and accessibility for researchers. The improvements in conservation, cataloguing and consultation in most Catalan archives over the last two decades of the 20th century does not do away with the obligation to continue condemning the vast gaps which still plague conservation and hinder consultation, especially in certain private and Church archives. However, there is no doubt that there has been a vast improvement, coupled with the enormous efforts to publish the sources, which has risen exponentially in recent decades. This set of documentation raises the need for caution when assessing the information it supplies, which must be duly weighed with the territorial gaps and the social omissions that have not reached us. At the same time, all the documentation divulged in recent years vastly expands the ability to absorb information and make comparisons that can help the historian. It must be accepted that the heuristic must be analysed as a duty for generations who today enjoy facilities that were unheard of for past historians, who nonetheless tackled the challenge of providing responses to the unanswered questions about this period.

In any event, it is important to specify and contextualise what happened during this period in the counties in the northeast of the Iberian Peninsula because the legacy that derives from these events includes the establishment of rights, duties, ties and taxes, a diverse and stable demarcation of the territorial dominions and a model of values and societal organisation. All of this would go on to condition the evolution in later centuries because it both was rooted in this earlier stage and projected arguments on which the discourse of power was sustained.

What are we talking about? The historiographic pathway

Tracing a historiographic pathway is essential for addressing the feudal world, because the research has repeatedly gotten stuck on the definition of both the object
and subject of study, and the contributions have often been weighed down by the specific interpretative baggage. Historiographically speaking, to find the point of departure there is no need to hark back now to the schema of the three hierarchical functions of the Indo-European ideology proposed by Dumézil – priests, warriors and commoners – retail rather than to the three forms of government proclaimed by Aristotle – βασιλείαν, ἀριστοκρατίαν, πολιτείαν – which, the Late Mediaeval political and social thought assumed through Thomist realism. This was spread by means of authors like Francesc Eiximenis, who supported a municipal power that took over representation of the estates, equating them with the country and conditioning the power of the sovereign. In his utopian Oceana dating from 1656, James Harrington started with a similar scheme centring power on land tenure and the balance of government necessarily agreed to between the sovereign and the official estates, perceiving a specific balance in this mediaeval model in which he includes the Iberian Peninsula: "If the Few or a Nobility, or a Nobility with the Clergy be Landlords, or overbalance the People to the like proposition, it makes the 'Gothic' balance and the Empire is mix'd Monarchy, and that of 'Spain', 'Poland' and late of 'Oceana'’. Thus, rural property ownership and the rights that came with it, guaranteeing the estates enough power to be able to impose conditions on the Sovereign, shaped a model of government that was ideologically sanctioned by the Church. It was a system that emerged in the Middle Ages, with a birth date that dovetails with the development of personal ties and the establishment of the realms that conditioned access to lands owned by others, fiefs. As Henry Spelman published in 1626, in England the date was 1066, given that it was a model imported by the Norman conquerors – "feudorum servitutes in Britanniam nostram primus invexit Guilielmus senior conquestor" – who thus established a social and political framework that would remain stable, at least until parliament broke with the monarchy by executing Charles I in 1649. The reasoning is framed within the kind of historiography from that century which regarded the past with admiration, inquired into its institutions and, when analysing how they were intertwined with society, conceptualised feudalism within a rising interest in studying the Middle Ages. John Burrow precisely summarises the historiographic moment with the terms "Antiquarism, Legal History and the Discovery of Feudalism". Not only has the legal reflection on the contents of the feudal rights and responsibilities inherited from the Middle Ages been brought into the juridical reflection, but Spelman’s very reasoning can be assumed to be an interpretation of history as a kind of tripartite sequence around feudalism, as interpreted by Pocock in 1957 when he noted for the first time in "English history the division into pre-feudal, feudal and post-feudal periods which has ever since characterized it". It should come as no surprise that shortly afterwards, in 1959, Robert Boutruche refers to the same 17th century work as the first systematisation of feudalism as a social and political structure.

By defining the legal framework that interlinks society, feudalism can be identified with it. Feudalism was inherently an order based on pacts, as lauded by the Count of Boulainvilliers in 1727. However, Montesquieu added that "les lois féodales [...] ont fait des biens et des maux infinis", poking fun at the fact that "qui ont laissé des droits quand on a cédé le domaine; qui, en donnant à plusieurs personnes divers genres de seigneurie sur la même chose ou sur les mêmes personnes, ont diminué le poids de la seigneurie entière; qui ont posé diverses limites dans des empires trop étendus; qui ont produit la règle avec une inclination à l’anarchie, et l’anarchie avec une tendance à l’ordre et à l’harmonie.” It is clear, then, that if enlightened reason was to illuminate the new society, feudalism had to disappear, even though this might be difficult given its deep roots in the social fabric. Yet he also strove in favour of the values of tolerance and experience and attitudes towards agriculture and trade that are interpreted as being contrary to feudalism. In fact, the political system had to be changed because the “gouvernement féodal” was characterised, in Rousseau’s words, by being a “système absurde s’il en fût jamais, contraire aux principes du droit naturel et à toute bonne politique”.

The discussions on coeval peasant rights and tensions

Figure 1. Liber Feudorum Maior (Archive of the Crown of Aragon)
combine and lead to the fact that the “feudal regime has been among the central questions” in the French Revolution, equating feudalism with seigneurial rights while also simultaneously fostering a specific definition of the feudal regime by the bourgeoisie that spearheaded the French Revolution. The culmination, after the upheaval in the spring and summer of 1793 with the National Assembly’s suppression of the entire feudal regime on the 11th of August, revealed what was meant to be conceptualised under this expression: the personal servitude that hindered individuals from becoming landowners, inheriting or freely marrying without paying taxes; the exclusive rights to hunting grounds or dovecotes; seigneurial justice, symbolised by the gallow; the contributions from diverse perpetual tenures, censuses and portions of harvests; the inalienability of revenues; the tithe paid to the Church; pecuniary and tax privileges, either personal, corporate or territorial; limitations by reason of estate; the sale of public offices; and the Church’s recognition as an estate linked in fiscal and executive terms to Rome. What really changed behind the words enables us to question the intentions of those who held the power and headed the revolution, but in any event, it is clear that the goal was to label a period in time, the one that they supposedly set out to overcome.

With Karl Marx, equating feudalism and an entire society became the profile of a stage in humanity’s development by organising history along the lines of the systems used to extract revenue according to a materialistic conception, feudalism was a phase in human history somewhere between slavery and the bourgeoisie. Although the European Middle Ages were a period of darkness, they were not as bad as what would follow them. The latter period collided with socialism precisely because the radicalisation between the bourgeoisie and proletariat stemmed from breaking “all feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations” common to the Middle Ages, which was characterised by “the most heavenly ecstasies of religious fervour, of chivalrous enthusiasm, of philistine sentimentalism”. Thus, despite its rejection of the period, the reasoning does not deviate much from the positive assessments of a kind of feudalism that would carry the values of faith, loyalty, generosity, bravery and tenacity, as accepted throughout the entire 19th century, based on either Romantic recreation or Dilthey’s historicist formulation.

However, while Walter Scott champions the chivalry of Ivanhoe, he also criticises the lords ensconced in “feudal tyranny”. The Ancien Regime, feudalism and the nobility are blended together as the arbitrariness of yesteryear, which contrasts with the regime of liberties and progress promoted by the bourgeoisie who led the 19th century. It is a dichotomy that wrought major damage on mediaeval historiography, which has too long related feudalism with rural immobility oppression and has even painted the development of the communal movement as a conscientious urban revolt in an effort to achieve the liberties denied by the feudal lords. Scholars studying the roots of Catalonia in the period spanning the 19th and 20th centuries share this dual perception of feudalism: “the feudal organisation and the Benedictine monastic structure” would improve the “sorry state of anarchy” suffered at that time. Thus, “feudalism was a necessary social phenomenon, one of the transitory forms of civilisation”, although, as Torras i Bages added, it required rectifications of its “deformities” that were mainly derived from the tough tone “of the aristocratic spirit which a warring time naturally engenders”. Aulèstia tried to ensure that these negative aspects did not mar the entire period: “it is erroneous to believe that in the centuries that witnessed the birth of feudalism, which we have gotten used to viewing through a false prism, stagnation and ignorance utterly prevailed, and that lords and vassals were like two powers in constant confrontation”. Delving further into this line of reasoning, he highlighted the socially positive consequences of the interaction and contact fostered by the feudal system – “the lords were in constant contact with the commoners, the vassals could see their lords up close and there was thus an exchange of habits and customs, of ideas and interests” – as well as the mutual guarantees of economic and social survival: “feudalism came to respond to the status of production at that time, ensuring the livelihood of the commoners, who would often have been the victims of economic fluctuations if left to their own devices”. One could demur that these words were influenced by the author’s ideological background, although at the same time other historians with a similar social stance, such as Chia and Hinojosa, accentuated the oppressive nature of feudalism, as it generated an unequal system that was generally harmful for the peasants, who were burdened by their lords with onerous conditions. For this reason, the emergence of feudalism was simultaneously the trigger of a specific and grave “agrarian question” which, aggravated by the evolution of the Late Middle Ages, led to the uprisings at the end of the Middle Ages, which were intense enough to call greater attention than the origins of feudalism itself, as was accepted at least during the half-century that separated Fidel Fita’s works from those of Elies Serra i Ráfols.

In fact, the glorification of the role of the Church and urban society in the coeval visions of mediaeval Catalonia in turn mars the image of everything related to the nobility, including feudalism. Thus, the bulk of the nobility was held responsible for the fact that the 11th century was plagued by “diverse revolts motivated by the tyranny and taxation of the feudal lords”, who were opposed by both the vassals, the victims of their abuse, and the counts, whose duty it was to defend the legal system, as Borí i Fontestà showed. The nobility’s ignorance and oppression could only be overcome in three ways. The first was the idealised vision of the Church, which would limit their excesses with measures like peace and truce, which emerged, in the words of Torras i Bages, from “the democratic spirit of the Gospel”, even though the triumph of feudalism, as heralded by Valls i Taberner and Soldevila,
would impose a contrast between figures like the Bishops Oliba, Saint Ermengol, Saint Ot and Saint Oleguer and the majority, who, “together with the character of large feudal landowners, many of them, imbued with the spirit of the new regime, acted like secular lords”. At the same time, this was helped by contact with a more cultivated society, that of Occitania: “the marriages of almost all the sovereigns from the March to princesses from beyond the Pyrenees would bring refinement to the feudal customs”. And the correction would particularly come from municipal pressure, thus highlighting the opposition between the nobility and the bourgeoisie. Although he acknowledges that “feudalism in Catalonia did not come with the horrors of other countries”, Font i Sagué describes this opposed duality: “within the system of feudal jurisdiction there lived slave generations, like the serfs subjected to the legal hurdles, called ‘mals usos’ (abuses), as they were more favourable to the lord than the vassal. Yet free republics also blossomed here. The ‘cartes de població’ (town charters) granted to some major towns, especially the ones falling within the territories that had recently been conquered, largely served to counterbalance the preponderance of the feudal system.” The Church and the counts would thus become the referents that enabled the escalation in noble aggression to be halted, and both of them would provide the legislative checks and balances: the constitutions of peace and truce, approved at the Vic assembly in 1033, and the Usatges of Barcelona, which dated from around 1068 under the rule of Ramon Berenguer I, thus further consolidating his pre-eminence. Despite the important palliative that these deeds entailed, the permanent halt to the feudal gloom ultimately had to come from the bourgeoisie’s ability to impose a new model of society, which did not take place until the 13th century. This is what Font i Sagué also states when he assessed the fact that during this century “public immorality continued; virtue only shone in the artisan and craftsman classes which, having their trade and industry assured, enabled the same livelihood to be passed on from fathers to sons”. The schoolbooks from the Republican period compiled and disseminated these opinions: feudalism “was a forced regime in which the feudal lords exploited the vassals and serfs in a burdensome way”. The situation could only be fully overcome when the alliance between the counts and the bourgeoisie was imposed on the feudal lords: “life in the villages and cities grew more robust and gradually became democratic. The counts had a vested interest in this, and they granted them franchises in order to weaken feudal power.”

The feudal structure would be articulated under Carolingian rule; for this reason, Antoni de Bofarull spotlights the milieu of Wilfred the Hairy, “close to the military part under a feudal organisation”. This feudal order, which instilled a precise structure on which society could be defined, was fettered, then, by specific institutions, such as feudal-vassal relations, as stressed by Max Weber in accordance with the coeval historiography. Certainly, if the institutional bond defines feudalism, we must discern between it and the lordships, as noted by the powerful Germanic historiography from the second half of the 19th century, which dovetailed with the disquisition prof-fered by prestigious authors like Fustel de Coulanges in French historiography by separating land ownership from the feudalism identified with institutional articulation. In 1893, Charles Mortet admitted that even though he preferred to understand feudalism “au point de vue de la sociologie générale” and therefore applied a global vision of society to it “que pénètre le corps entier jusque’à ses parties les plus profondes et réagit sur toutes ses fonc-tions vitales”, the word gradually became limited to referring to “l’ensemble des institutions publiques et privées”. This is the approach that dominated Western historiography until the last third of the 20th century – albeit with notorious exceptions, especially in the English-speaking world – thanks to the dissemination of French works, like the renowned manual by Ganshof, which has been const-antly translated and reissued since 1944. Since 1959, it cannot fail to be paired conceptually with Boutruche’s voluminous tome, as both envisage an early Carolinian feudalism that reached its institutional peak, in the guise of classic feudalism, between the 10th and 13th centuries. Despite adhering to such a specific formulation as the institutional realm, feudalism marked the entire historical period. In 1946, when Joseph Calmette published his view from the decline of the Roman Empire until the 13th cen-tury, he explicitly titled it Le monde féodal.

If everything hinged on an institutional formulation, we can easily grasp that this would have both a chronological and physical point of departure. The discrepancy between Montesquieu, who regarded feudalism as a European particularity – an “événement une fois dans le monde et qui n’arrivera peut-être jamais […] que l’on vit paraître en un moment dans toute l’Europe, sans qu’elles tinsset à celle que l’on avait jusques alors connues” – and Voltaire, who saw it as an extremely ancient form that was present under different administrations in three-fourths of the hemisphere, is centred by Georg von Below on the Roman-Germanic world. Thus, given that the feudal-vassal profile furnishes the definition, we could perceive an exemplary epicentre of feudalism between the Seine and the Rhine, from which it would radiate out towards the North Sea and the Loire. From there on, feudalism would be duly exported and adapted to each place, as claimed in numerous books on mediaeval history: “vassalage pene-trated European society from top to bottom, spreading in diverse guises from France to England, Germany, Italy, Spain and even Palestine”, always duly exported.
Sánchez-Albornoz, who promoted it in a truly axiomatic way to present a Castile under a seigneurial regime without feudalism, as emblematically elaborated upon by his disciple Hilda Grassotti. In Sánchez-Albornoz’s opinion, the footprint of the Middle Ages indelibly marked Spain and fully explains the entire later history, “from the early decades of the 8th century until the closing hours of the Spanish Civil War”, linking a particular history based on the death of the two cornerstones which, in contrast, were indeed present in other European countries: “Spain did not have either feudalism or a bourgeoisie. This undeniable reality entails numerous complex problems and is projected onto diverse horizons”. Incidentally, this reasoning highlighted the original singularity of Catalonia: the offspring of Charlemagne, it witnessed a feudal dissemination that spread to the rest of Spain only much more secondarily, with the consequent institutional differentiation, justifying points of departure that uphold different identities. Thus, “Catalonia receives a Frankish character, which lasted like all birthrights” in the words of Carles Cardó when, just after the Spanish Civil War he sought to discern the traits that had defined the regions of the Iberian Peninsula, and for this same reason, hindered its permanent cohesion, with all the serious secular consequences this entails. Jaume Vicens i Vives, influenced by Toynbee, was convinced that he was able to detect the essence of the Catalan identity, in which he viewed pactism as a basic, crucial cornerstone. Naturally, pactism comes from the sound feudal approach: “the profound sense of our mediæval society lay precisely in pactism, that is, in the conception that a pact with the sovereign should regulate all collective human and political organisation: this fact has an inevitable feudal forerunner; seeing feudalism as tying people to people, not people to the land”.

Beyond the specific example of Catalonia, Vicens i Vives himself viewed feudalism as “a comprehensive organisation of society and the economy”, evincing a global view that included the whole. Back in 1911, American historian Henry Osborn Taylor accepted the institutional basis of feudalism as a “principle of mutual truth between lord and vassal”, yet at the same time he emphasised that in fact, “the feudal system was founded on relations and sentiments”, stressing the values of the feudal chevalier. In a different way, when invoking the values of feudalism in the years between the two World Wars, European authors, especially those from Italian and Germanic culture such as Malynski, Evola, Franz and Brunner, virtually laud it by appreciating its organic nature and individuality as a veritable alternative to the ills that they imagined in the rationalism and egalitarianism of Western democracy. The same vision of the whole, albeit from a different angle, coevally led to a contrary position by British authors like Coulton, in pointing out the social inequality and condition of the peasantry – “it is patently absurd to speak of the medieval peasant as leading a life of Arcadian simplicity”. However, he did acknowledge that the generic proposition of the feudal system did lead to progress towards the collectivisation of society: “this is characteristic of the half-way stage between wild individualism and modern collectivism which we call the Feudal System”.

Meanwhile, the rise of Marxism as an ideological beacon in the communist states conditioned thinking in Eastern European countries, where it was often repeated that “feudalism is a particular social and economic formation that is based on the feudal mode of production”. Based on that, with a mechanistic scheme as summarised by Udaltzva and Gutnova, they perceived “the predominance of the agrarian, natural economy; the preponderance of large land ownership based on the exploitation of the peasants who personally depended on the landowners or were bound to the lands they worked”. This situation that would trigger “the formation of the main classes in feudal society”, and as a corollary, “the appearance of the feudal hierarchy, of law, of the state as well as the ideology and culture”. It was “a universal formation that developed spontaneously”, which “the majority of peoples in the world have experienced”.

Figure 2. Allegiance. Liber Feudorum Maior (Archive of the Crown of Aragon)
In view of the both institutional and epicentric perspective, materialism can serve as the point of departure in the predominantly agrarian production model and work towards an overall understanding of society by gradually bringing in the consequences for the people. This was the challenge that was met in the West, from different vantage points, between the end of World War II and the penultimate decade of the 20th century, with authors like Harvey, Dobb, Dyer, Kula, Vilari, and Bonnassie. The latter offers us the appropriate definition: “a social regime that was based on the often brutal confiscation of the profits (the surplus) of peasant labour which guaranteed their redistribution within the dominant class through a more or less complex system of networks of dependency (vassalage) and rewards (fiefs)”. The reconciliation between materialism and the urban world, which the diverse authors from East Germany examined, culminated in the 1970s, actually opening up a new paradigm that totally overhauled the perspectives, as demonstrated by the conclusions reached by Pierre Toutbert in Lazio, Pierre Bonnassie in Catalonia and Jean-Pierre Poly in Provence. Their respective studies of these nearby areas reached similar conclusions that were both striking and novel: they all saw a sudden feudalisation, chronologically situated within a few decades in the 11th century, in which a basic, accelerated Hegelian scheme took place, where an initial stage, which would such extend important features of classical society as slavery, would act as a thesis that collided with its antithesis, thus giving rather abrupt rise to a synthesis, the synonym of feudal stability which was characterised by the patrimonialisation of public power, the surge in personal ties, the prominence of the aristocratic military caste and the establishment of seigneurial rights as an integral part of the barons’ local power over the peasants, combined with the freedoms achieved by the cities. Thus, a new paradigm emerged for interpreting this period, its reasons and its consequences, as historiographically framed and synthesised by Jean-Pierre Poly and Éric Bournazel in 1980 with their explicit work La mutation féodale. X-XIIe siècles.

What actually occurred was a veritable historiographic mutation. From then on, it was difficult to continue to explain feudalism on the sole basis of its institutions, which, as Fossier said in 1982, was still rather surprising because after all, everything was based on a tally of the obligations and rites of less than one percent of the population. Nor does it make sense to take epicentric and centrifugal visions: the very evolution of society drove feudalism and, as Fossier also indicated, paradoxically “it can be seen increasingly clearly that feudalism between the Loire and the Rhine was nothing more than an idea, and that precisely the southern regions was where it was best illustrated”. A new chronological vector also gained ground, far from the fall of the Roman Empire and the Carolingian stabilisation. And all of this was achieved through a painstaking methodological overhaul based on a materialistic method capable of avoiding the traditional dogmatisms and gaining, with a great deal of rigour, new conceptual realms for Hegelian hermeneutics and Marxist thinking.

At the same moment, the attempts to posit feudalism as a phenomenon that was present around the world were spurring criticism of ethnocentrism and the transfer of European concepts, if not sheer discredit and the accusation of a loss of meaning of the concept of feudalism. Precisely from another perspective, and in view of the different approaches to the phenomenon in mediaeval Europe, Elizabeth Brown concluded that the interpretative difficulty may revolve around the very historiographic pathway, which has created an object of study based on different and contradictory definitions and contents, with which it has generated a historiographic fallacy that is far from the reality and has thus turned historians into the dependent victims of the tyranny of a historiographic construction. This opinion actually draws from
the lines of revision that have been singularising important sectors in the United States and Canada since the 1960s. This has been fairly evident since 1964 in the work of Ambroise Raftis, the leader of the so-called ‘Toronto School’, who has addressed the study of the mediaeval peasantry from different vantage points finding almost no room for seigniorial pressures or peasant resistance, and has easily reached the positive tones used by Alan Macfarlane in 1978. When witnessing the exercise of violence, the focal point of the research does not even hone in on the social costs, rather on the anthropological interpretation of the political implications. This can be seen when Andrew Lewis, Geoffrey Koziol and Barbara Rosenwein focus most of their attention on the nobility or their relationship with the Church, which enables them to discuss their mutual coexistence, hardly without having to mention the peasants, as Weinberger does in his Provençal observatory.

In Europe, as well, Alain Guerreau pursues another vantage point when trying to centre a rational scheme on the functioning and evolution of feudal Europe around four lines, namely the relationship of dominance, artificial family ties with their concomitant arrangements, the ecosystem and the position of the Church, all analysed by drawing on updated perspectives and with the aid of such related sciences as anthropology. However, the historiographic debate was taken up again in 1989 by Guy Bois when he embedded the mutationist explanation into the heart of Burgundy, formulating a general theory by studying the specific case of Lounard, which explains the sudden change imposed by the violence of the lords in the penultimate decade of the 10th century, triggering an economic, social and political change in just 30 or 40 years. Thus, Guy Bois elevates the changes in AD 1000 to the point of revamping the concept of materialistic revolution posited by Marx, by situating the prime function that used to be attributed to the fall of the Roman Empire in that historical juncture. Yet at the same time, he advances towards overcoming the initial tripartite scheme by embedding the mutation in AD 1000 in a vision of humanity that would concatenate the sudden, revolutionary change in a cyclical way. The suddenness inherent in this explanation rectifies the modulation that the Marxist approaches had adopted; although they dated the major shift in the 3rd century crisis, they had made headway in understanding that the change was not sudden, but rather the outcome of a progression that lasted centuries, thus explaining it as a succession of transitions, as Perry Anderson had explicitly posited. The sudden change around AD 1000 fully fitted within the vision that Bonnassie had emphasised in 1983 in the case of Catalonia. Even though he had provided no new heuristic underpinnings, he accentuated his own position by underscoring the violent, sudden nature of the change, which would destroy the state of liberty in which the peasants lived after having overcome the phase of slavery: “ce qui frappe le plus, c’est la rapidité et la violence des transformations qui ont affecté la société catalane au xiᵉ siècle. Le régime féodal, qui ailleurs a parfois mis un siècle à s’imposer, l’a emporté ici en l’espace d’une génération, en vingt ou trente ans (entre 1030/1040 et 1060)”. Despite the novelty of the claims for such a swift global change and the contribution of innovative interpretations of the role played by the people and institutions that spearheaded these events, the general conclusions do not so much lead to a rupture in the historiographic pathway as reveal the capacity to fit the axial explanations assumed since the 19th century into a materialistic format with a rigid Hegelian structure, given that the course of events continued to point to a society that by the mid-11th century had suffered from the tensions triggered by the nobility, generated a regime that was oppressive to the peasants, articulated a new model of relationship based on feudal-vassal ties and given rise to a balance of power that revolved around the Count of Barcelona, thus achieving a state of stability that was clearly articulated in the drawing up of the tiny initial core of the Usages of Barcelona. The acceptance and dissemination of this explanation had to do with the quality of the research, with an ideological context that was highly receptive to the methodological and interpretative underpinning used, and with the fact that it had staunch proponents. Thus, acceptance of the model spread. Although unverified, this gradually took up the media space inasmuch as it was used by other historians as the foundation. With this dissemination, Catalonia became one of the new paradigms of feudalism, gaining prominence abroad. Until then, feudal Catalonia had had only a limited presence, usually stressing its differences from the rest of the Iberian Peninsula through the fact that it took part in feudalism, albeit to a lesser degree than inland France. Shortly thereafter, as the last third of the 20th century got underway, the divulgation of authors like Vilar and Burns in the English-speaking world had begun to focus attention towards Catalonia as well.

Bonnassie’s explanation took shape as a very tight, well-argued model, which is why it was so easily exported. The author himself spread a shared vision from the Rhone to Galicia, and the features observed in Catalonia influenced the studies conducted in the rest of the peninsula. The upshot was highly identical visions, as in the explanation proffered by Ernesto Pastor Díaz de Garayo on Castile, and even more so by Juan José Larrea on Navarre. The critiques question whether the analysis has done much more than align the historical facts in order to copy the model tested a quarter of a century early in the northeast of the Iberian Peninsula, thus exemplifying a study in which the prior method and model can actually strangle the interpretative power: “having reached the end of the work, one is left with the feeling that the conclusions drawn on some points are more the outcome of the systematic application of a model of historical interpretation that is accepted as absolute truth than a critical reflection on the sources used”. More re-
cently, Bonnassie’s model has been explicitly tested on the area of Castile-Leon by Carlos Astarita, who accepts some aspects of it but not others, like the sudden nature of the social change.\textsuperscript{152}

At the same time, many mediaevalists in the United States had focused on such aspects as textual critique, anthropological concerns and specific philosophical contributions.\textsuperscript{153} This is the suitable framework for an examination of the social reality in the Middle Ages, including its tensions, through explanations that are distant from the class struggles between lords and peasants, as shown by Tebrake, Wunderli and especially Justice.\textsuperscript{154} These approaches were not closely followed in Catalonia in the 1980s, where they were succeeded by popular expressions based on Bonnassie’s model, disseminated with summaries that are almost denuded of any nuances: “In the late Middle Ages (9th to 10th centuries), the peasants were the owners of their lands. It was not until the transformations in the 11th century, at the time when the lords of the castles usurped the counts’ authority, that the situation changed. Without the count’s protection, the peasants were defenceless before the lords, who used all manner of violence to seize the lands.”\textsuperscript{155} The full acceptance of these ideas, the statement that the epicentre of grasping feudalism had shifted to southern Europe and the assumption that Catalonia had become the new paradigm of the matter took according to the experts) shaping a new socio-political system called ‘feudalism’. Thus, to the advantage of some and disadvantage of others, one of the first processes of the mutation opens up new perspectives while also adding new rigidities that the documentary evidence would rectify.\textsuperscript{156} In a different vein, a more in-depth examination of 12th century violence by Garf\textsuperscript{160} and Bisson\textsuperscript{162} revealed that aggressiveness was not the occasional result of a sudden mutation, but rather encroached into the ensuing century, that is, that the processes of privatisation, patrimonialisation and manorialisation lasted longer: we can no longer talk about a sudden revolution. In any event, as Bisson notes, we should label it a “quasi-revolutionary transformation of power”.\textsuperscript{161} The core of this revolution lay in the oppression of the peasantry and its swift evolution, which quickly went through the three stages that Josep Maria Salrach condensed into a title: “slavery, freedom, servitude”.\textsuperscript{164} However, the studies on the status of the peasantry before feudalisation offered a major rectification of this position, as put forth explicitly by Gaspar Feliu: “not everyone was a slave, few savoured full freedom, the new domination which was not servitude for everyone, came with landowning rights”.\textsuperscript{166} Paul Freedman also nuances the peasantry’s supposed phase of full freedom prior to feudalisation,\textsuperscript{167} and he particularly stresses the lack of a sudden change and the absence of servitude until the 12th century, extending it now to the 13th century,\textsuperscript{168} meaning that he could explicitly refute the mutationist proposal: “the peasants were not fully autonomous before 1020, nor had they been enslaved in 1060, nor even in 1160”.\textsuperscript{169} This is a conclusion that Lluís To also adheres to after analysing the process of the spread of servitude to northeast Catalonia, the result not of the 11th, but the 12th century.\textsuperscript{170} At the same time, the supposed legal peak achieved in the mid-11th century with the formulation of the first core of the Usatges becomes impossible to uphold after the studies by Gouron\textsuperscript{171} and especially Iglesia,\textsuperscript{172} which characterise this compilation of laws by supplementation of the old Visigothic law, the reception of Roman law and the emergence of the 12th century sovereign. On the other hand, the development of studies focusing on various counties, especially the ones open to the frontier, have revealed their importance in the entire social evolution between the 10th and 12th centuries,\textsuperscript{173} as well as the full capacity and evolution of the different countships.\textsuperscript{174} This has meant situating the political unification of the northeast of the peninsula around the House of Barcelona in the 12th century,\textsuperscript{175} precisely when the concatenation of the different factors of cohesion led to a unitary perception of Catalonia.\textsuperscript{176}

Thus, the paradox was that while the popular accounts continued to repeat the model formulated a quarter of a century earlier, every study of specific factors provided elements that spurred an in-depth revision. It is understandable that by 1989 Manuel Riu warned that “Catalan feudalism is quite far from having been thoroughly studied”.\textsuperscript{177} In 1996, Paul Freedman underscored the uniqueness of the Catalan version of history within the context of international historiography: “Outside Catalonia, the archaeo-Marxist theory of a change in the means
of production situated around AD 1000 does not have many followers"). However, in 1997, when taking stock of the most recent studies, Antoni Riera stated the explanatory change in the country’s inland regions in the scientific fields: “today the hypothesis of the French historian – still upheld by Josep Maria Salrach and, with less conviction, Lluís To – is suffering the onslaughts of other alternative, more gradual visions”. In fact, the revisions of the explanations on the evolution of Catalonia agreed with the revision that the mutationist model underwent in other countries, especially France, where a questioning of the method used and a comparison of the conclusions justified Dominique Barthélémy’s verdict that “la notion d’une crise sociale génératrice de la ‘société féodale’ doit disparaître”.

The shadow of deadlock looms. The different avenues for interpreting feudalism were shown to be useless and, more importantly, contrasting, and they gave rise, as Paulino Iradiel warned in 1984, to “a cloud of controversial definitions and pointless terminological discussions”. Curiously, one of the terms most often used with feudalism is “cloud of concepts”, as Giuseppe Sergi did in 1993. Perhaps the best course of action would be to avoid the term. Barbara H. Rosenwein observed that the leading authors do not try to reconstruct supposed models like feudalism, rather they attempt to resolve specific points within the research: “le problème n’a plus guère d’intérêt aujourd’hui, alors que les historiens les plus en pointe en ce domaine tentent de comprendre les époques non plus par leurs rapports à des modèles réifiés de l’Antiquité ou du féodalisme, mais comme des moments spécifiques”. More strikingly, in 1994 Susan Reynolds published a comprehensive study to warn about the legal devices that have led researchers to fall into the morass of taking feudalism for granted to the point of no return. What does this mean? The answer is “cloud of concepts”.

The fit of the most recent studies and the ease with which the sources can be consulted facilitate our understanding of what happened in the Catalan countships between 10th and 12th centuries, revealing the gradual nature of the changes. One can agree with the conclusions reached by José Ángel García de Cortázar in noting a concatenation of alterations in Castile and Leon from the 7th century until the stabilisation in the 12th century. Recently, Thomas N. Bisson has stressed the entrenchment of feudalism in the 12th century, matching it with the struggle to define sovereign power within the coeval context in Europe. This thus becomes a proposition which in turn complements the vision of this century so often disseminated based on its urban and cultural profile.

Unexpectedly, in 2008 a work by Eugene Mendonsa was published that once again upheld a sudden change in the society of the countships in the northeast of the Iberian Peninsula between the years 1020 and 1060. Based on “an anthropological view”, the author spotlighted the case of Catalonia as an example of “the fabrication of domination” based on control of the economic and political mechanisms, combining “power, property (or profit) and prestige”. Mendonsa revisits all the elements of the mutationist explanation of Catalonia – the sudden change, the oppression of the lords (“reign of terror”), the Hegelian scheme with the pre-feudal order at odds with its antithesis (“a lack of universally accepted law”) and the ultimate seizure of power by the countship of Barcelona – and he elevates as paradigmatic “the case of how the Count of Barcelona did this after the breakdown of the state, the ‘seigneurie banale’ (1020-1060) or the ‘times of troubles’
The Catalonia of the 10th to 12th centuries and the historiographic definition of feudalism is a classic case”. In Mendonsa’s work, what particularly merits attention is the function granted to the role of the written document in strengthening power and establishing a system to exploit the peasantry, “because elites in Catalonia used writing as a tool of oppression”, even though he did not elaborate on this idea enough. At the same time, also worth highlighting is the author’s desire to fit the deeds within a broad avenue of reflection on “the fabrication of domination” in social behaviour, placing the case of Catalan feudalism in the context “of domination to the entire span of human history from the Palaeolithic to the present”. However, in the end what matters is the importance of chronological rigour and the basic dependency on documentary research. These are two facets missing in this work, which leads to inappropriate pairings in the former and the dependency on certain authors in the latter. Despite the obvious effort to include and use a far-reaching, up-to-date range of bibliographic sources, the author does not rely on his own consultation of the documentation and leaves his critical capacity linked to certain authors who have preceded him, which in the end discredits the entire work.

**Explanatory axes of the evolution of the countships in the northeast Iberian Peninsula between the 10th and 12th centuries**

The global visions are proven in the resolution of the doubts posed by the documentation, which is a veritable testimony to the past even though it might sometimes be a bit diffuse. Thus, for example, according to the mutationist interpretation, the counts scrupulously respected the legal order (thesis) while the nobles interposed abusive taxes under often violent pressure, such as *toltes* and *forces* (arbitrary taxation or demands on the vassals) (antithesis). However, when we more closely examine the documentation, an identical demand by both sides becomes clear back in the early 11th century. One could deduce that they all shared the same mindset and that they therefore evolved together according to their respective interests. This interpretation might appear logical, but it is incompatible with the interpretative approach adopted, so when faced with this paradox, Salrach deduces that this behaviour among the counts springs from the fact that “there is an exception to every rule”. This answer is obviously reminiscent of Procust’s bed, the same one that Rosenwein reproached in Bois in 1991, by viewing that if reality does not fit with theory, it must be stretched or removed, just like the legs of the man occupying Procust’s bed. One of the landmarks in the violence perpetrated by the nobility was the revolt of the young Mir Geribert against the Count of Barcelona, in an assault on the count’s palace. However, in 1985 Enrique Ruiz-Doménech drew conclusions much simpler than the deeds: “the adolescents were agitating because the count was weak and to hinder him from leading them into war with the outside. There is no need to see this event as a political crisis, and even less as a class struggle. Let us not get carried away.” As mentioned above, the structuralist perspective behind this statement leads to new rigidities that often succumb to documentary proof, but at least it opens up a host of different interpretative possibilities which nonetheless have to be evaluated in accordance with the documentation. The notable rise in publications of sources makes study easier, and one could conclude that just like in this case, the documents available do not always lead to the deductions made by Bonnassie. Precisely in 1996, Paul Freedman called for a re-interpretation of the documents on which the French author based his thesis, because we surely agree now that “this documentation does not serve to demonstrate the onset of serfdom”; “to me they do not seem to be transactions in which people are sold as property, as slaves, but sales or arrangements of productive land, land with tenants who farm it, just as today one can sell an urban plot of land with tenants who pay the rent. Perhaps there is a certain mindset in the documents, a tendency to associate peasants with plots of land, but there is no indication of personal servitude.”

Therefore, the first lessons to be deduced are very simple and elementary in the profession, and refer to the hierarchisation between method and documentation, to the fit between the two necessary underpinnings, heuristic and
hermeneutic. We are not far from the revisions that were repeated in recent years. In 2000, Randall Collins questioned the obsession found in much of 20th century historiography with obtaining globalising interpretative models, and in 2002 Matt Perry was amazed at the forcefulness with which certain materialist schemas had affected the endeavours of many historians from the previous century. Along the same lines, in 1997 García-Guijarro lamented the fact that an accentuation of the historiographic perspectives developed during the 20th century had excessively criticised the positivist legacy beyond its evident context-dependency. There is no doubt that, as Artola said, one is not a historian only by virtue of having visited the archive and explained what one has read in a modern language, rather one becomes a historian by knowing how to interpret the information. However, cases like the one we are examining in this article beckon us to fine-tune the gradation required and the need to place documentation that is as stripped-down as possible before the method, so that the set of interpretative tools does not end up excessively devouring it. At the same time, we must also acknowledge the valour of all the preceding authors who have dared to grapple with the major questions using the scarce tools at their disposal; however, this requires the ensuing generations not to be led astray by alien ideas, rather to use all the tools and capacities at their disposal to conduct a constant revision according to the advances in documentary knowledge, facilities for consulting and studying this documentation, and also the lessons that can be gleaned from the historiographic detours.

If the challenge, then, is to resume the documentary analysis in order to analyse what happened in the counties in the northeastern Iberian Peninsula between the 10th and 12th centuries, we can also wonder what label it should be given. Should we keep talking about feudalism, as historiography has done from such different and even contradictory viewpoints? Or should we surrender to the evidence that there was no society that used this definition before the 18th century? Given the preceding historiographic debate, can a new, objective approach be attained, or will we draw too close to the disenchantment, encystations or sectorisation with which the controversy on this subject seems to have been damaged in recent years? And in any event, to what extent is Catalonia a paradigm of a global approach and to what extent does it show significant features of its own, ranging from the importance of the frontier to the difficulties of political cohesion?

A detailed examination of the documentation reveals the incorporation of the term “fief”, specific institutional and documentary practices and a framework of artificial ties beginning in the 11th century, thus altering the forms of interaction and determining the development of certain values. These values would be instilled into the nobility, but so would literary and religious expression, as well as the ideological framework with which the Church moved and heavily affected society’s values. In coherence with this entire reality, we can use a common, traditional term like feudalism, but its content must be adjusted to the main axes on which the documentation is founded. More than anything, this entails examining its interpretive vectors.

First of all, we must note the point of departure on the process of seigneurisation and encastellation that filled the 9th and even more, the 10th centuries. Precisely when the monasteries and bishoprics looked after their own interests by ensuring that the respective patrimonial base was strengthened through different strategies that played with donations and judicial instruments, the leading families of viscounts and vicars were striving to bolster their own family lineages and sources of income. The patrimonialisation of the post, which was public before then, and the revenues earned by both exercising it and projecting it into the frontier areas ensured the rise of and proximity to the power of the counts. The counties were just consolidating their own autonomous capacity with both mutual collaborations and tensions in drawing up the boundaries of the demarcations, with the major clash between the landowners of Cerdagne and Carcassonne over Rasez, which was echoed in the dispute between the counts of Cerdagne and Barcelona over the boundaries of the counties of Berga and Manresa. All of this fell within a framework of boundary rivalries coherent with the need to establish the outer limits of the counties. More importantly, the counts had to work with the clergy and the barons to articulate and structure the hierarchy of the milieu of power. They granted public goods and rights, conferring immunities on religious centres and places with their own rights, either on the frontier – such as the cession of Freixe in 954 by the count to the viscount of Barcelona – or inland – such as the cessions of Olzinelles and Polinyà. The cessions did not stave off the major tensions that would break out in the second half of the 10th century, as the counts clashed with the barons who aimed to retain the revenues they earned from private property. The episodes – which are historiographically obfuscated by the spotlight on the ensuing century – led to the serious uprising in Besalú which cost the count his life in 957, the dispute against the Counts of Cerdagne over the properties that the viscounts of Conflent finally managed to retain in 959 and the accusations of treason by the Count of Ribagorça against those who seized assets from him in 964. This dynamic consolidated a social stratum of lords and territorial domains subjected, in the many different senses of the word and with all their rights, to private owners. Coherently, the counts generally addressed themselves to the “vicecomites et seniores”, as the Count of Barcelona did in 986. In this context, the boundary castle, heading its district, became the basis of the division of the land into districts, both inland and on the frontier, thus shaping the relationship between the lords, the tenants of the land and the people living inside the limits of each castle’s domains.

Secondly, we must recognise the crucial importance of the frontier. The borderlands were initially an unstruc-
ured region and therefore open to spontaneous occupation, such as freeholdings, which would be disputed by the later implantation of castles and their domains.\textsuperscript{231} However, the existence of these cases cannot be extrapolated to define the borderlands as a place where the peasantry found land and freedom until they were assaulted by the nobility, as has been repeated in the historiography under the influence of the "mythe de la paysannerie pionnière".\textsuperscript{232} The frontier was particularly the object of projection of the family lineages by the viscounts and vicars and the Church hierarchy in the 10th century, as the entire frontier area was articulated through the linkage of the boundary castles.\textsuperscript{233} The frontier became attractive more through the rights that occupation itself generated than for the pillage inherent in it.\textsuperscript{234} In the 11th century, the frontier was swallowed up by becoming a paradigm of the feudal space, and the territory was articulated by the inextricable concatenation of boundary castles, and their subdivisions into quadres and the even smaller subdivisions of termes that allowed for full control of the people inside and the strengthening of ties, rights and perennial earnings,\textsuperscript{235} which would be extended with secular consequences, especially through the corresponding pyramidal structure of castellans erected in each castle’s domain.\textsuperscript{236} These earnings justified the bellicose expansion into Islamic lands, which facilitated the exemplarily feudal armed structure that culminated with the capture of Lleida and Tortosa in the mid-12th century.\textsuperscript{237} This closure of the frontier was related to the onset of a new phase of internal violence at the end of the century, because the barons especially needed money and grain to flaunt the level that they felt entitled to.\textsuperscript{238}

Thirdly, we must grasp the significance and limitations of violence. Far from the generic aggressiveness of the lords against their peasant underlings, the majority of attacks were waged against lordships with whom they had a motive for dispute. When the violence was waged within one’s own jurisdiction, it tended to try to prevent freeholdings which, as such, blocked the lord’s ability to levy taxes. This is why the peasantry often suffered from aggressions by the lords against intermediate landholders, often men of the cloth, as paradigmatically occurred in Igualada in the dispute between the Òdena family, as lords of the place, and the monastery of Sant Cugat del Vallès, which claimed the land as a freeholding.\textsuperscript{239} Far from being an antithesis for promoting a specific reaction, violence became part and parcel of the system, primarily affecting the peasants for a number of reasons: in the 11th century over the clashes between lords; in the shift from the 11th to 12th centuries primarily over the disputes about direct rule and freeholdings; in the mid-12th century over the skirmishes between lords and castellans over the rights claimed by the latter; and towards the end of the century over the predations of aristocrats who wanted to maintain their ability to flaunt their status, even though they were unable to earn revenues from the frontier, which was now closed. In a peasantry that was gradually drawing the relationship between tenure, inheritance and land closer together\textsuperscript{240} in the turn of the 12th to 13th centuries, this context extended the personal ties to the land in order to guarantee production for the lord and protection for the peasant.\textsuperscript{241} We must also further nuance the purported ties between violence and fiscal pressures. Globally, we can perceive no sudden switch in tax rises, rather a progression in taxes and concentration of freeholdings. However, the specific casuistic is quite diverse, including numerous cases of a drop in the taxes levied in the second half of the 11th century. Generally speaking, an agreement was reached about the farming of the land, either initially or later after acts of intimidation. Thus, with this, the land was taxed. The majority of peasants worked these lands under ground rent, in both the interior and on the frontier, which facilitated the dual-rule systems which could be defined under emphyteutic formulas in the 12th century.

Fourth, we must properly situate the notions of law and justice. The judicial system evolved from the initial count system to the lords, with much of it exercised by the clergy, especially in conflicts over property. It ended up serving the lords clearly starting in the last quarter of the 11th century, when trial by ordeal ceased to be the supposed guarantee claimed by the accused party and was instead revealed as a weapon of intimidation demanded by the judge against the plaintiff, who often gave in out of terror, such as when the cathedral of Urgell demanded the tasca (a tithe consisting of 1/11 of the harvest)\textsuperscript{242} from Tuixén in 1081 or when the lord and the castellans claimed compensation for baiulia in Taradell in 1100.\textsuperscript{243} This forced the legal arguments but did not mean that people lived without rights: throughout the century, the Lex root-ed in Visigothic law not only justified the rulings but also permeated all aspects of daily life, as is perfectly clear by its constant invocation until the early 12th century. The Usatges did not come about ceremoniously and suddenly to sanction a new era, but were more a sum of the usualia with which the judges adapted the Visigothic legislation to the new circumstances, that is, complementing and extending it. Starting from the early 12th century, this was aided by the penetration of Roman law, which was gradual, swift and without ruptures.\textsuperscript{244} The legislative endorsement would be achieved that aimed to justify both the pre-eminence of the sovereign and the rights of the feudal lords and the pressures of urban collectives, a step towards the proper juridical conceptualisation for the new framework of balances of power, of social relations and of access to the same units of revenue and jurisdiction to differing degrees. This would culminate when society integrated the dispositions between direct and perpetual tenures and between mero et mixto imperi into its daily life.

Fifth, we must understand the contents of the mores and values generated and accepted by society. We have to undramatise the system of personal ties and view it as the political and territorial structure adapted to the new social reality towards which all the social sectors were heading,
each with its respective interests. The Church played a crucial role here: having clearly benefited from the previous process of encastellation and signeurialisation, it became a pioneer in using the formulations of feudal links and relationships; its rights and revenues benefited from a veritable clericalisation of justice; it protected itself using mechanisms like sanctuary and peace and truce of God, which simultaneously enhanced its social clout; it embraced Gregorian reform as a means of strengthening the Church’s power; it bolstered its physical presence with a wave of newly created parishes; and it provided the discourses on social and political legitimacy and from this stance accentuated its influence over the population, conditioning its consciences, modulating its world view and imposing a model of family based on monogamous, indissoluble and exogamous marriage. This was the framework for strengthening family lineages, which generated specific forms of solidarity and were attentive to a patrimony through which they move towards agnatic primogeniture. A family lineage requires memory, with all its corollaries of evocation, gestuality and commemoration, and it was the Church that helped to develop the suitable stories and safeguard the places of memory where the respective pantheons could be kept. By accepting feudalism as a value system, we can grasp that it permeated all the social strata and became embedded in the different forms of communication, including religious, artistic and literary expressions.

Finally, we must perceive that all roads lead to the 12th century, not because this century brought a stagnation in this evolution but because it fostered the feudal and urban stimuli, a far cry from the lack of communication imagined by the historiography for so long. The derivations of the extension of Roman law in the different realms, the strategies of pre-eminence of the Count of Barcelona, who had held the royal title since 1162, and the openness to stimuli coming from diverse geographic horizons came together to shape the complexity of the society that entered the Late Middle Ages.

Notes and Bibliography

[1] This article is part of the research project: “Identity, Memory and Ideology in the Middle Ages” (HAR2009-08598; Ministry of Science and Innovation, government of Spain). It benefitted from my stint as guest professor at Yale University during academic year 2008-2009; it recognises the State University of New York for my stay in New York in the summer of 2009; and it gratefully acknowledges the facilities offered by the New York Public Library to study its collections.


[4] Here Richard J. Evans’ words are in order: “So when Patrick Joyce tells us that social history is dead, and Elizabeth Deeds Ermarth declares that time is a fictional construct, and Roland Barthes announces that all the world’s a text, and Frank Ankersmit swears that we can never know anything at all about the past so we might well confine ourselves to studying other historians, and Keith Jenkins proclaims that all history is just naked ideology designed to get historians power and money in big university institutions run by the bourgeoisie, I will look humbly at the past and say, despite them all: It really happened, and we really can, if we are very scrupulous and careful and self-critical, find out how it did and reach some tenable conclusions about what it all meant” (Richard J. Evans. In Defense of History. W. W. Norton & Company, New York-London 2000, p. 220).


15. The count of Barcelona Ramon Berenguer I can be imagined as the "real creator of the principality of Catalonia as a true feudal state" (César González. "La multiplicación de los reinos (1035-1079)". In: Vicente Ángel Álvarez Palenzuela (dir.). Història de España de la Edad Media. Ariel, Madrid 2002, p. 264).


25. With respect to documents from Urgell from the 11th century and earlier, Trenchs and Conde concluded that "in some cases it is impossible, even today, to know which documents are false or inserted" (Josep Trenchs and Rafael Conde. "La escribanía-cancellería de los Condes de Urgel (siglo IX-1414)". In: Folia Munichensia. Institución Fernando el Católico, Zaragoza 1985, p. 17).


35. José Eduardo Reis. Do espírito da utopia: lugares


[42] “C’est un beau spectacle que celui des lois féodales. Un chêne antique s’élève; l’œil en voit de loin les feuillages; il approche, il en voit la tige; mais il n’en aperçoit point les racines: il faut percer la terre pour les trouver” (Montesquieu, De l’esprit des lois, book xxx, ch. 1; www.classiques.uqac.ca/classiques Montesquieu/de_esprit_des_lois/partie_6/de_esprit_des_lois_6.html).


[61] Jaume Sobrequés noted that “the vast ingenuity of this historiographic conception of Aulèstia is a clear exponent of the conservative thinking of a large swath of the Catalan bourgeoisie at the end of the century” (Jaume Sobrequés, “Les historiographies de Catalunya en el periode historic de la Renaixença i el Romanticisme (segle xix)”. In: La historiografia catalana. Balancı perspectives. Cercle d’Estudis Històrics i Socials, Girona 1990, p. 30).


[100] Otto Brunner. Land und Herrschaft: Grundfragen der territorialen Verfassungsgeschichte Südostdeutschlands im Mittelalter. Veröffentlichungen des In-


[122] The claims of southern European feudalism were spotlighted at a famous encounter held in Rome in 1978: Structures féodales et féodalisme dans l’Occident médiévanen. École Française de Rome, Rome 1980.


[136] In this sense, it is a necessary rectification given the fact that, as Jean-Louis Paul comments: “la théorie de la succession des modes de production –esclavage antique, servage médiéval, salariat industriel– est inapplicable comme description d’étapes chronologiques” (Jean-Louis Paul, L’automne de la Féodalité. Essai sur la formation du monde éta


[143] Worth noting is Josep Maria SALRACH: although in the early 1970s he started with an acceptance of Boutruche’s institutionalist approaches – “it is a positive definition of feudalism” (Josep Maria SALRACH. “Régimen señorial y feudalismo en la Alta Edad Media”. Anuario de Estudios Medievales, no. 7, Barcelona 1970-1971, p. 791) – he shifted to accepting Bonnassie’s explanations (Josep Maria SALRACH. Història dels Països Catalans. Dels orí
gens a 1714. Edhasa, Barcelona 1982, pp. 330-361), developed them in his extensive research, promoted them in numerous books with a high readership and entered the 21st century even defending the same formulations and metaphors that Bonnassie had used (Josep Maria SALRACH. “¿Qué diferencia

[144] Still in 2001, Pere Ortí began his well-founded research on the origins of bovatge (a direct tax on livestock and tangible goods at the start of a reign) in the 12th and 13th centuries, taking for granted that the feudal pacts established in the mid-11th century enable him to state that: “between 1060 and 1070, all of Christian Catalonia was joined for the first time under the authority of the counts of Bar
celona and were the vassals of nobody” (Pere Ortí, “La primera articulación del estado feudal en Cataluña a través de un impuesto: el bovatge (ss. xii-

[145] For example, a common manual like the one by Previté-Orton limits itself to saying that “social and constitutional conditions in the Christian States of Spain during the process of the Reconquest varied according to the state, but as a whole were more advanced and, save in Catalonia, less feudalized in jurisdic


[147] Pierre Bonnassie. “Du Rhône à la Galice: genèse et modalités du régime feudal”. In: Structures féodales et féodalisme dans l’Occident méditerranéen (xe

ladolid 1996.


[152] “This perspective draws closer to the thesis of feu-
dal mutation by granting priority to political power as the means of forming the lordships, yet it departs from this thesis by stating that no sudden, regionally synchronous change took place through the ‘ex nihilo’ violent imposition of new customs (Carlos Astarita. “Prácticas del conde y formación del feudalismo. Siglos viii al xi”. Anales de la Universidad de Alicante. Historia Medieval (Revista de Historia Medieval), no. 14, Alicante 2003-2006, p. 21).


[158] José Enrique Ruiz-ROMÉNEC. “La primera estructura feudal (Consideraciones sobre la producción, el poder y el parentesco en Cataluña durante el siglo xi)”. Quaderns Catanens de studio Classici e Medieval, no. IV/8, Catania 1982, pp. 301-368.


[172] Limited space means that of his extensive, meticulous oeuvre on the Usatges, in this article we shall only cite the following: Aquilino IGLESIAS, “De Usa- tici quomodo inventi fuerunt”. Initium, no. 6, Barce- lonal, 2001, pp. 25-212.


[202] In the preface to the book, Mendonsa confesses that “I started writing parts of this in 1980 but life intervened and I am just now finishing it up in 2007”, and actually, although he reads, synthesises and explicitly cites important recent contributions by authors like Bisson, Freedman and Kosto, among others, the backbone of the work seems to be more an-


Flocel Sabaté. “La tenencia de castillos en la Cataluña medieval”. In: José Vicente Cabezuelo (ed.). Alcaïdías y fortalezas en la España medieval. Marfil, Alcoi 2006, pp. 70-76.


Flocel Sabaté. “Frontera peninsular e identidad (siglos ix-xii)”. In: Las Cinco villas aragonesas en la Europa de los siglos xii y xiii. De la frontera natural a las fronteras políticas y socioeconómicas (foralidad y municipalidad). Institución Fernando el Católico, Zaragoza 2007, pp. 76-94.


Flocel Sabaté. “Les castanies i la comissió de 1328”. In: Estudios sobre renta, fiscalidad y finanzas en la Cataluña bajomedieval. CSIC, Barcelona 1993, pp. 177-241.


Lluís To. Família i hereu a la Catalunya nord-oriental (segles x-xii). Publicacions de l’Abadia de Montserrat, Barcelona 1997, pp. 217-245.

Memory, as one of the three powers of the human being - “intellectus, ratio et memoria” (Yale Beinecke Library, ms. 189, f. 11r) - is consciously extended to be anchored in the bond and solidarity of one’s own specific family lineage (Flocel Sabaté. Identity, Memory and History, available shortly).


About the Author

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